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SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS IN THE MARKET FOR
CORPORATE INFLUENCE
PaulRose*
Abstract
The period from 2003 to 2013 shows a remarkable shift in the use and
effectiveness of shareholder proposals. While shareholders pursued many
different types of proposals over this period, this Article identifies eight
types of proposals as most important to corporate governance. This Article
then provides evidence of how shareholders used and voted on these
proposals, helping to provide clarity to the role of shareholders in corporate
governance. The evidence presented in this Article shows that shareholders
are increasingly willing to pursue proposals that enhance the accountability
of managers. Voting patterns, however, reveal that shareholders are
cautious in how they allocate power, reflecting legitimate concerns over
the risk of empowering minority shareholders who do not owe fiduciary
duties to their fellow shareholders. While most shareholders support
measures that facilitate managerial discipline, they are more cautious in
supporting proposals that empower other investors and augment the
influence of minority shareholders over managers.
This Article develops a theory of shareholder voting that suggests this
behavior reflects shareholder concern over two types of costs. First, the
majority of shareholders operate under information-cost constraints as
diversified investors who generally have significant informational
asymmetries with respect to management. Therefore, these shareholders
will tend to seek low-cost signals of firm performance. This conclusion
predicts support for disciplining proposals that allow shareholders to key
off of basic financial performance measures such as market price. Indeed,
as other scholars have noted, the majority of shareholders are most
interested in defensive, ex post activism that reduces managerial
entrenchment and exposes managers to the market for corporate influence
and corporate control.
Second, the significantly lower levels of support for empowering
proposals may be explained by common agency costs that arise as
numerous shareholder/principals seek to influence a single set of
manager/agents. The significant empowering proposals identified in this
Article have a common feature: they all promote shareholder influence in
excess of a commensurate economic interest held by the activist
shareholder. This common feature raises concerns that activist
shareholders will attempt to use their influence to extract private benefits at
the expense of other shareholder/principals. However, most shareholders
* Associate Professor of Law, The Ohio State University. The author thanks participants at
the 2013 National Business Law Scholars Conference for helpful comments and suggestions, and
Kelly Kozich and Brittany Pace for excellent research assistance.
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appear to recognize the threat presented by a common agency in which
small block holders are empowered to influence management, and such
proposals therefore receive significantly less support.
INTR ODUCTION ...................................................................................
I.

2 180

THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF SHAREHOLDER

PRO PO SA LS ..........................................
2185
II.

EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SHAREHOLDER

PRO PO SA LS ..........................................
2189
111.

TRENDS IN SHAREHOLDER VOTING: 2003-2013 ............2197

A. The New Era of CorporateGovernance
Proposals:2003-2013 ................................................ 2201
B. Types of CorporateGovernance Proposals................ 2202
IV.

CATEGORIZING SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS: THEORY

AND R ESULTS ........................................
2217

A . Information Costs ........................................................
B. Common Agency Costs ................................................
C. ShareholderMotivations: DiscipliningVersus
Empow erment ..............................................................
C ON CLU SION ......................................................................................

2218
2219
2220
2226

INTRODUCTION

Shareholder proposals were long thought to be merely a sideshow in
corporate governance, a mechanism for gadflies, cranks, and the
economically irrational to harass corporate boards and executives. For
many years this was largely the case, as shareholder activists produced
proposals that were soundly defeated at the corporate ballot box-often
receiving support from less than 5% of the outstanding shares of the
company if the proposal managed to get on to the corporate ballot at all. In
recent years, however, shareholder proposals have become an increasingly
important mechanism in corporate governance. No longer the province of
crank activists-more accurately, no longer solely the province of crank
activists, since they are still active to some degree-proposals targeting
managerial agency costs, particularly, receive increasing support from
shareholders. More importantly, directors are acting on the signals that
shareholder votes provide. When negotiations fail, shareholder proposals
become the front line in contests for corporate influence. Quite simply,
shareholder proposals matter in corporate governance; they matter a great
deal.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss6/5
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Two primary types of shareholders drive corporate governance activism
in the United States and so are major participants in what Professors John
Armour and Brian Cheffins have called the "market for corporate
influence."1 The first type is the purely financial investor-typically a
hedge fund-that pursues corporate governance changes designed either to
increase the fund's ability to directly cause an event that will have
empowering financial results for the fund, or as part of a multistage process
intended to enhance the fund's ability to influence corporate decisionmaking.2 For example, hedge funds have been active in pushing various
"good governance" measures (scare quotes intended-it is not clear
whether all such measures actually produce better governance outcomes).
Good governance measures-including, for example, majority voting or
the declassification of boards of directors-remove some of the insulation
protecting boards of directors and managers from annual accountability
and, to some degree, influence from shareholders. 3 But when hedge funds
pursue these changes, they are not betting on the mere possibility that
good governance" pays. Rather, hedge funds are profit maximizers that
look for the best possible returns and pressure corporations to undergo
events like share repurchases, mergers, spin-offs, or dividend payments;
hedge funds pursue "good governance" to facilitate the extraction of value
from an investment in public corporations. 5 Reducing the frictions that
allow for shareholder influence is a primary goal of activist hedge funds
and unites their interest with other governance activists, such as public
pension funds.
The second type of investor tends to be more focused on long-term
governance changes. Public pension funds, an example of this type of
investor, have successfully pushed corporate governance reform through

1. Brian R. Cheffins & John Armour, The Past, Present, and Future of Shareholder
Activism by Hedge Funds, 37 J. CORP. L. 51, 58-59 (2011).
2. See id. at 56-58, 60-62.
3. See id.; Nicole M. Boyson & Robert M. Mooradian, CorporateGovernance andHedge
Fund Activism, 14 REv. DERVATIVES REs. 169, 170-72 (2011), available at
http://link.springer.com/journal/11147/14/2/page/i (analyzing empirical data to demonstrate that
hedge funds employing activist strategies, such as initiating changes in corporate governance,
induce the "largest improvement in target firm performance"); Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund
Activism, CorporateGovernance,andFirmPerformance,63 J. FIN. 1729, 1741-45 (2008) (noting

that hedge fund activism commonly includes, inter alia, targeting firm governance and efforts to
declassify the boards).
4. A prolonged (and seemingly endless) debate has attempted to answer the question of
whether good governance pays. Certainly, bad governance costs. See generally Lucian Bebchuk et
al., What Matters in Corporate Governance?, 22 REv. FN. STUD. 783 (2009) (analyzing the
relationship between management-fiiendly governance provisions and firm value). However, it is
considerably less clear that installing a series of specific corporate governance structures will
necessarily improve corporate performance.
5. See Bray et al., supra note 3, at 173 1.
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shareholder proposals. 6 Beginning with CalPERS 7 in the 1970s, public
pension funds have a long history of pursuing governance changes.' As
with hedge funds, public pension funds often bring proposals for financial
reasons, although their motivation tends to be punitive rather than
prospective. Public pension funds may focus on particular companies
because of poor performance, and they may attempt to force governance
changes as a way to limit or punish managers who underperform. 9 Hedge
funds may also focus on poorly performing managers because they know
that support for such managers will be lower, and so the fund will be more
likely to achieve its objectives. However, the motivation for hedge funds is
not the same as for pension funds: The pension fund is interested in
shareholder proposals as a mechanism for disciplining the manager and
reducing managerial agency costs,' while the type of hedge fund that seeks
a governance change through a proposal does so as part of a larger strategy
to increase shareholder power and influence so as to catalyze an event or
otherwise influence firm activities.
This is not to say, of course, that these events are not beneficial to the
corporation or to other shareholders. Undoubtedly, many such transactions
are beneficial as the company spins off less profitable businesses or returns
funds to shareholders rather than leaving them in the hands of managers
who may not have a good use for them. However, this Article is not
concerned with the question of the value of shareholder activism, which
has already received significant attention elsewhere. 1 Instead, this Article
presents a theory based on evidence of the actual behavior of shareholders
in the market for corporate influence. The Article thus does not make an
argument about how shareholders shouldbehave in the face of shareholder
proposals; rather, it explores how shareholders actually vote-the best
indication of what shareholders value in corporate governance-then it
addresses the undertheorized question of why they vote as they do. To
assist in the analysis of this question, this Article makes use of an
extensive dataset from thousands of shareholder votes, compiled by proxy
6. See Boysan & Mooradian, supra note 3, at 171. Individual shareholders have a long
history of pursuing corporate governance changes, but have been much less successful in
convincing other shareholders to vote with them compared to public pension funds. See text
accompanying infra note 59.
7. CalPERS stands for the California Public Employees' Retirement System. CALPERS,
http://www.calpers.ca.gov/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2014).
8. See Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance
Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 797 (1993) ("Public funds have, in fact, been more active

than other institutional investors in corporate governance over the past few years, offering
shareholder proposals and engaging in other highly publicized activities to influence management
actions.").
9. See, e.g., id. at 818.
10. See id. at 795-96 (discussing the increased role of public pensions in disciplining
management).
11. See, e.g., Cheffins & Armour, supra note 1, at 56-58, 60-62.
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solicitor Georgeson Shareholder between 2003-2013.12
In examining the use of shareholder proposals and developing a theory
to explain how they operate in the market for corporate influence, this
Article makes three important contributions to the understanding of
corporate governance. First, and contrary to the notion of shareholder
proposals as a governance afterthought, this Article shows the power and
importance of shareholder proposals in current corporate governance.
Today, most shareholder proposals are not set forth by irrational cranks,
but by sophisticated activists who have the attention of boards of directors
in a way that has never been seen before.
Second, this Article provides a more robust framework and typology for
understanding shareholder activism and defining shareholder proposal
'1 3
types. Crucially, this Article demonstrates how "rationally reticent"
shareholders react to influential shareholder activism. The framework
relies on an understanding of how shareholder voting is affected by both
information costs and "common agency" costs-the costs incurred when
multiple principals (in this case, powerful shareholders) attempt to
influence the behavior of their agents (the board of directors). 14
Third, this Article contributes to a larger debate within the academy,
industry, and the legal profession on the optimal allocation of power within
a corporation, and how the role of federal law affects that allocation of
power. Those supporting the traditional "director primacy" model of
corporate governance contend that directors are and should be "the means
and ends" of corporate governance-that they do and should retain the
ultimate say in the governance of the corporation.' 5 Director primacy
resists calls for accountability and cautions that weakening the authority of
directors will result in a less efficient mode of governance. Additionally,
supporters of this model note the danger of reliance on an agency-based,
shareholder-centric model of governance which "would occasion
significant agency costs of its own by forcing management to a market
price set under asymmetric information in most cases and set in speculative
markets in which heterogeneous expectations obscure the price's

12. See GEORGESON SHAREHOLDER, 2013 ANNUAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REvIEw (2013),
availableat http://www.georgeson.com/us/resource/Pages/acgr.aspx (delineating a review of annual
corporate meetings, shareholder initiatives, and corporate proxy contests).
13. "Rationally reticent" means "willing to respond to governance proposals but not to
propose them." Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs ofAgency Capitalism:
Activist Investors and the Revaluation of GovernanceRights, 113 CoLUM. L. REv. 863, 864 (2013).
14. Paul Rose, Common Agency and the Public Corporation,63 VAND. L. REv. 1355, 1359
(2010).
15. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, DirectorPrimacy: The Means andEnds of Corporate
Governance,97 Nw. U. L. REv. 547, 550 (2003).

16. See id. at 573-74.
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informational content in others." 17 Aside from the powerful economic
arguments offered in favor of director primacy, the theory has a powerful
legal basis: Section 141 of the Delaware General Corporation Law, which
places the management of Delaware corporations in the hands of
directors.' 8
Delaware case law aims to increase shareholder value over any other
end. 19 However, Delaware law still views directors as the primary power
within the corporation; their efforts may well be directed to shareholder
value, but the means of achieving that value are left to the directors'
discretion.2 ° While director primacy is very much a theory linked to state
law, "shareholder primacy" increasingly takes its power from federal
regulation of corporate governance. Indeed, it is precisely the federalization
of corporate governance that presents the greatest threat to the director
primacy model and the greatest hope to proponents of shareholder primacy.
Director primacy is not wholly compatible with agency models of the
shareholder-director relationship. As Professor Stephen Bainbridge puts it,
directorial power is "sui generis"; directors may be elected by
shareholders, but they are not mere agents of the shareholders. 2' By
contrast, proponents of shareholder primacy tend to simplify corporate
relationships to an essential, core principle that fully embraces agency
models of the corporation: the directors work for the shareholders.? The
shareholders elect the directors, who in turn select managers and other
employees.23 All these agents ultimately answer to the owners (as
proponents characterize the shareholders) of the corporation.24
Federal regulation of corporations tends to support this agency-based
model,25 and in the past few years, it has become apparent that the
federalization of corporate law is no longer "creeping., 26 The pace toward
more federal control of corporate law is accelerating, at least with respect
to public companies. However well-documented may be the merits of
17. William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder
Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 654 (2010).
18. DEL. CODEANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2011).
19. Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware'sTakeover Law: The UncertainSearch

for Hidden Value, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 521, 527 (2002) ("The point is that under Delaware law, the
board must always maximize shareholder value."). For a recent example, see eBay Domestic
Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 33 (Del. Ch. 2010).
20. See Newmark, 16 A.3d at 33 (noting that while the court typically will not question the
rational business judgments made by directors, corporate boards should nonetheless "ultimately
promote stockholder value").
21. See Bainbridge, supra note 15, at 560.
22. Id.at 563-65.
23. See id. at 567.
24. Id.at 563-65.
25. Rose, supra note 14, at 1364-65.

26. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The CreepingFederalizationof CorporateLaw, REG., Spring
2003, at 26, 26.
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director primacy, and equally well-documented the concerns with
shareholder primacy, it seems increasingly apparent that the tide of the
battle is shifting in favor of shareholder primacy and an agency-based
model of the corporation. This is partly a function of the ratcheting effect
of federal law; the tightening of federal law over public corporations
appears inevitable, given modem interpretations of the Commerce Clause
under which public corporations seem within easy reach of federal
regulation. Indeed, in the past ten years the Sarbanes-Oxley and DoddFrank Acts significantly tightened federal control over public corporations.
In showing how shareholder proposals-a mechanism which is regulated
primarily through federal rules-function in corporate governance, this
Article helps to tell the story of shareholder proposals as one front in a
battle between competing visions of corporate law: a state-law-based
model in which power is retained by directors, and an increasingly
federally-dominated model in which directors are seen as agents of
shareholders.
However the analysis set forth in this Article demonstrates that there
may be less to fear from shareholder power than its detractors have
suggested. Shareholder voting trends suggest that although shareholders
tend to support governance changes that enhance managerial accountability
(and, arguably, decrease the effectiveness of boards), they are more
hesitant to vote for governance changes which would not serve to merely
discipline managers but would empower shareholders through, for
example, the expansion of voting rights or by providing
shareholders with
27
additional avenues to influence firm behavior.
Part I of this Article outlines the legal and historical basis for the use of
shareholder proposals as a tool in corporate governance. Part II reviews
evidence on the effectiveness of shareholder proposals in corporate
governance. Part M1reviews trends in shareholder voting during the last
eleven years-the most active period for shareholder proposals since the
advent of federal securities laws-showing how shareholder proposals can
have both manager-disciplining and shareholder-empowering effects. Part
IV advances a theory to explain shareholder voting behavior, focusing on
information costs incurred by shareholders in determining the extent of
their involvement in governance and the common agency costs incurred
through shareholder empowerment.
I. THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS

The logic of the shareholder proposal is simple and ostensibly
democratic. It echoes the initiation of a state constitutional amendment, a
political procedure familiar to citizens of many different states, including

27. See infra Part IV.
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California, Florida, and Ohio. 28 Like a citizen's submission of a statewide
ballot initiative, shareholders submit to management a matter for inclusion
in the company's proxy materials. Unlike ballot initiatives, which typically
have a binding effect on the state legislature, the proposal seeks the votes
of other shareholders as an expression of shareholder preferences.29
However, except in the case of binding bylaw proposals, which are limited
to issues of process rather than substantive matters, directors retain the
discretion to act on the proposal.30
For public U.S. companies, shareholder proposals operate within an
amalgamated regulatory system that layers federal rules on top of a basic
state law foundation. Under the corporate law framework in operation in
Delaware and other states, shareholders are able to make precatory
proposals on a variety of issues, including general corporate governance
and social interest matters.3 1 For publicly traded companies, federal law
governing shareholder proposals more directly regulates questions of
shareholder eligibility to submit proposals and the content of shareholder
proposals, among other things. 32
Shareholder activism is tightly linked to federal regulatory changes. In
the early part of the twentieth century, regulations limited shareholder
activism primarily to powerful individual or firm investors, who often held
seats on boards and had direct influence over the direction of the
company. 33 However, as concerns grew over the influence and market
impact of these powerful investors, a series of new laws-including the
Glass-Steagall Act in 1933--effectively limited the power and influence of
banks, insurers, mutual funds, and other financial intermediaries, and

28. Elizabeth Garrett, Hybrid Democracy, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1096, 1096 (2005)
("Seventy-one percent of Americans live in a state or city (or both) that allows the popular
initiative .... Massachusetts, Maine, and Florida have relatively robust systems of direct
democracy, as do New York City, Houston, and Columbus.").
29. See Elise N. Rindfleisch, ShareholderProposals:A CatalystforClimate Change-Related
Disclosure,Analysis, andAction?, 5 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 45,57 (2008) ("Shareholder proposals are
a means for shareholders to compel the management of a corporation in which they own securities
to hold a shareholder vote on a proposed issue.").
30. See CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 234 (Del. 2008).
31. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson et al., How the Proxy Rules Discourage Constructive
Engagement: RegulatoryBarriersto Electing a Minority ofDirectors, 17 J. CORP. L. 29,45 (1991)

(discussing shareholder ability to submit precatory shareholder proposals "urging management to
change board size, composition, or representation").
32. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2011).
33. Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, The Evolution of ShareholderActivism in the United
States, 19 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 55, 55 (2007) [hereinafter Gillan & Starks, Evolution of
ShareholderActivism] (noting that "[i]n the early 1900s, American financial institutions such as
insurance companies, mutual funds, and banks were active participants in U.S. corporate
governance. In many cases, the representatives of such institutions... served on corporate boards
and played major roles in the strategic direction of the firm").
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"prevented them from having an active role in corporate governance." 34 In
this respect, the effect of Glass-Steagall worked against the shareholderempowering impulses of the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. 3
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) attempted to
revitalize shareholder activism through the passage of the predecessor rule
to today's Rule 14a-8, which ushered in the modem era of shareholder
proposal-based activism. 36 For the first three decades after its enactment,
the SEC's shareholder proposal mechanism was used primarily by
individual gadfly investors (who are still at work today, though now less
prominently, as other activists have grown in importance). 37 Had proxybased shareholder activism remained merely the passionate hobby of these
individual investors, there would be little real corporate governance impact
to report. However, with the formation of the Council of Institutional
Investors in 1985,38 institutional investors became much more involved in
corporate governance, and companies began to pay more attention to
shareholder voice as expressed both directly and through proxy
34. Id. (citing Mark J. Roe, Politicaland Legal Restraints on Ownership and Control of
Public Companies, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 7, 11-12 (1990)).
35. The work of Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means has been asserted to be an important factor
in the development of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934:
Berle and Means' study prompted reexamination of the regulations affecting
corporate governance structures ....
Instead, the law attempted to institutionalize
the ideal of corporate democracy and to give more active control to shareholders.
Underlying this attempt was the belief that shareholders did not participate in
corporate management because it was difficult for them to do so, and if
corporations made shareholder participation easier, shareholder behavior might
change. Based on the notion that shareholders needed better and more information
in order to assume some degree of effective control over corporations, Congress
enacted the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Carol Goforth, Proxy Reform as a Means of IncreasingShareholderParticipationin Corporate
Governance: Too Little, but Not Too Late, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 379, 385-86 (1994) (footnotes
omitted).
36. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8.
37. See Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, Corporate Governance Proposals and
ShareholderActivism: The Role of InstitutionalInvestors, 57 J. FIN. EcON. 275, 281 n.7 (2000)
[hereinafter Gillan & Starks, CorporateGovernance Proposals].
38. Jesse Unruh, the California State Treasurer at the time, formed the Council ofInstitutional
Investors
in response to learning that the Bass Brothers, after acquiring a 9.8% block in
Texaco [in which both the CalPERS and the California State Teachers Retirement
System (CalSTRS) were invested], sold the shares back to Texaco at a $137
million premium over the current market price-a repurchase offer that was not
extended to other shareholders like CalPERS and CalSTRS.
Gillan & Starks, Evolution of ShareholderActivism, supra note 33, at 56-57.
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proposals. 39 Led primarily by public pension funds and labor union funds,
institutional investor activism has shifted from the submission of proposals
to be included in poorly performing or poorly governed companies' prox1
statements and proxy cards to more direct engagement with companies.
In the case of CalPERS, engagement followed
activism by naming-and41
List.
Focus
CalPERS
the
shaming through
The SEC has repeatedly attempted to calibrate the effectiveness of its
shareholder-proposal rules. In 1998, for example, the SEC passed a
significant rule designed to increase shareholder participation (particularly
individual shareholder participation) in corporate governance by rewriting
Rule 14a-8 in "plain English" and putting the text of the rule in a questionand-answer format. 42 The 1998 changes also expanded the scope of
shareholder proposals by stating that certain employment-related
shareholder proposals would no longer be per se excludable under the
"ordinary business" exclusion in Rule 14a-8. More recently, the SEC has
tried 44 and failed 45 to enhance the effectiveness of shareholder proposals as

39. See Gillan & Starks, Corporate Governance Proposals,supra note 37, at 281, 303
(reviewing 2,042 corporate governance-related proposals submitted between 1987-1994); see also
Lawrence A. Cunningham, Deferred Prosecutions and Corporate Governance: An Integrated
Approach to Investigation and Reform, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (2014) (discussing the impact of
institutional investors on the corporate governance movement). Compared to proposals from
"gadfly" investors, proposals from institutional investors tend to get more support from other
shareholders, and the effectiveness of shareholder proposals generally increases when activism is
coordinated. Gillan & Starks, CorporateGovernance Proposals,supra note 37, at 281, 303.
40. Gillan and Starks report that
public pension funds changed their approach to activism in the early 1990s. One
important change was to submit fewer proxy proposals while trying harder to
initiate a dialogue with targeted companies' managers and boards. Another was to
make greater use of the media in targeting companies, while alerting other
investors to the firm's problems and the activist's proposals.
Gillan & Starks, Evolution of ShareholderActivism, supra note 33, at 57.
41. CalPERS Focus List Program has been in operation since 1999, and as of October 2011
had engaged 110 companies privately and had publicly named 59 companies that had not responded
favorably to CalPERS' concerns. See Letter from Andrew Junkin, Managing Director & Thomas
Toth, Managing Director, Wilshire Assocs., to George Diehr, Chair, Inv. Comm., CalPERS (Oct.
25, 2011), availableat http://www.calpers-govemance.org/docs-sof/focuslist/201 1-10-25-corp-govwilshire-study.pdf (describing the Focus List Program that can be found at http://www.calpersgovemance.org/focuslist/focuslist).
42. Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 23,200,67
SEC Docket 373 (May 21, 1998).
43. Id. Under the "ordinary business" exclusion, a shareholder proposal may be excludable by
the registrant from its proxy statement and form of proxy "[i]f the proposal deals with a matter
relating to the company's ordinary business operations." 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(7) (2011).
44. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 9,136,99 SEC
Docket 439 (Aug. 25, 2010).
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a disciplining device by allowing shareholders, under certain conditions, to
include their own director nominees in the registrant's proxy.
Although shareholder proposals have been used regularly by
shareholders for over seventy years, the question driving much research on
proposals as a corporate governance device is still the most basic: Are
shareholder proposals effective? This question can be framed in several
ways. First, one may ask whether shareholder proposals have an impact on
share prices; in other words, do shareholders in general value shareholder
proposals, as indicated by stock price movements? Next, one may ask
whether shareholder proposals have an effect on managerial behavior;
under what conditions do managers listen to shareholders and alter
corporate governance structures in response to shareholder demands?
Finally, one may ask whether shareholder proposals are effective in
creating long-term value for shareholders; if directors and managers make
changes based on pressure applied through shareholder proposals, are these
changes value-enhancing over the long term?
Shareholder activism in general-and shareholder proposals in
particular-has been a source of active analysis over the last two decades.4 6
The following Part discusses the three central and related considerations
identified in the above questions: the impact of proposals on share prices;
the effect of shareholder proposals on managerial behavior; and whether
shareholder proposals have a positive effect on long-term shareholder
value.
II. EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS

Numerous studies have evaluated the effect of shareholder proposals on
firm performance and firm value over the time period considered in this
Article.4 7 The central issue driving these studies is whether shareholder
proposals are a useful mechanism for disciplining managers and limiting
managerial agency costs. 48 Working against the effectiveness of
shareholder proposals are several possible weaknesses: that proposals may
be ineffective because they are merely precatory in nature; 49 that
45. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1155-56 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (enumerating the
rule's failures and holding that the "Commission was arbitrary and capricious" in promulgating the
rule).
46. Gillan and Starks, for example, summarize a sample of thirty-eight studies-most of
which dealing with shareholder proposals--conducted between 1993 and 2006. Gillan & Starks,
Evolution of ShareholderActivism, supra note 33, at 61-62.

47. For a broader review of the empirical literature on shareholder proposals through 2007,
see generally id.
48. See, e.g., id. at 58 ("Shareholder activism is, at bottom, a response to the potential gains
arising from addressing the agency conflict at the core of large publicly traded companies with
absentee owners.").
49. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Casefor Increasing ShareholderPower, 118 HARv. L.

REv. 833, 846 (2005) (positing that because precatory shareholder resolutions and proposals are not
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shareholders may be too uninformed to provide meaningful corporate
governance advice to managers; 50 or that shareholder proponents may use
the proxy process to promote their own private agendas.
The study results are mixed, but several trends emerge. First, in early
studies-particularly those reviewing proxy seasons in the mid- 1990s and
earlier-shareholder proposals were found to have little or no effect on
either stock price or firm value.52 As noted above, institutional investors
began to engage in corporate governance matters in the mid-1980s, and
like the individual investors before them, apparently had little impact.
Single proposals by individual "gadfly" investors were-and generally still
are-unlikely to have much impact on the stock price, corporate
governance mechanisms, or corporate performance, because they were
unlikely to receive significant support from other shareholders and
therefore more likely to be ignored by management.54 Shareholders as a
group lacked cohesive views on appropriate governance structures, and
information costs were too high to allow most institutional investors to
make an effort to determine what those structures should be. As a result,
most shareholders were (and many remain today) rationally apathetic with
respect to corporate governance matters. 55 It was only when managers
failed spectacularly that most shareholders were willing to vote against
management.56
An important early study of this time period by Professors Stuart Gillan
and Laura Starks
examined the effectiveness of shareholder proposals from
57
the importance of sponsor identity and the
1987-1994. They documented
58
subject of the proposal. With respect to sponsor identity, Gillan and
binding, "directors have discretion whether to follow precatory proposals that receive substantial or
majority support, and directors' freedom to disregard such resolutions is protected under the
business judgment rule").
50. See id. at 880-81 (noting the imperfect information available to shareholders).
51. Id. at 876 (arguing that shareholders may not have incentive to bring proposals in "issue
contests" where the shareholders "cannot expect to obtain private benefits from control").
52. See Lee Harris, The Politics of Shareholder Voting, 86 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1761, 1799-800
(2011) (noting study results providing that shareholder proposals do not report a statistically
significant relationship between shareholder proposals and stock price returns); id. at 1778 ("In
short, many types of proposals that likely have a very low probability of improving firm value or a
high probability of entrenching management received unusually high numbers of votes."); Gillan &
Starks, Evolution of ShareholderActivism, supra note 33, at 65.
53. Gillan & Starks, Evolution of ShareholderActivism, supra note 33, at 56, 63, 65.
54. See Harris, supra note 52, at 1786.
55. Bernard S. Black, ShareholderPassivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REv. 520, 524, 585
(1990).
56. See Gillan & Starks, Evolution ofShareholderActivism, supra note 33, at 66 (noting that
shareholder deference to and support of management varies with corporate performance, among
other factors).
57. Gillan & Starks, CorporateGovernance Proposals,supra note 37, at 277, 303.
58. Id. at 303.
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Starks found that proposals from individual "gadfly" investors garnered
fewer votes but were also associated with a slight empowering impact on
stock prices, whereas proposals sponsored by institutional investors such as
public pension funds received significantly more votes but had a "small but
measurable negative impact on stock prices." 59 Importantly, they were
already noting a trend by the early 1990s in support of shareholder
proposals, with voting outcomes indicating that "while the percentage of
votes cast in favor of the proposals averaged less than a60majority, the
percentage nonetheless increased over the sample period.,
Whereas in the past, nearly all shareholders did not believe it paid to
focus on corporate governance, more and more investors decided in the
1990s that it did pay.6 1 Primarily, this is not because the returns from
governance increased-as noted earlier, it was not clear then nor is it clear
even now that good corporate governance ensures better returns. Rather,
the cost of engaging in governance issues decreased due to regulatory
changes, the creation of shareholder coalitions with common interests and
goals,62 and later, the emergence of the corporate governance industry as an
information gathering and dissemination utility and common mouthpiece
on many shareholder rights matters. 63 Thus, over the last two decades
shareholder support for corporate governance proposals increased with a
corresponding increase in responsiveness to shareholder proposals by
managers.
The change in the effectiveness of shareholder proposals was first
identified and studied in 2007 by Professors Randall Thomas and James
Cotter, who found that although shareholders have had the right to offer
proposals for decades-and a small percentage had taken advantage of that
right-the proposals initially had very little effect. 64 However, in
examining a sample of proposals from the 2002, 2003, and 2004 proxy
seasons, they found a shift in value compared to proposals from the 1980s
and 1990s. 65 They noted that unlike social issue proposals, corporate
governance proposals tended to receive significant support, consistent with
59. Id. One explanation for the drop in stock price has been offered by Professors Andrew
Prevost and Ramesh Rao, who found that shareholder proposals are typically offered only after
direct, behind-the-scenes engagement with management has failed. Thus, shareholder proposals
may be a sign that management is not responsive to shareholder concerns, resulting in a drop in
stock price. Andrew K. Prevost & Ramesh P. Rao, Of What Value Are ShareholderProposals
Sponsored by Public Pension Funds?, 73 J. Bus. 177, 178 (2000).
60. Gillan & Starks, CorporateGovernance Proposals,supra note 37, at 303.

61. See Gillan & Starks, Evolution of ShareholderActivism, supra note 33, at 60.
62. Id. at 56-57.
63. See generally Paul Rose, The CorporateGovernanceIndustry,32 J. CORP. L. 887, 89698 (2007) (discussing the development of and eventual market for the corporate governance
industry).
64. Randall S. Thomas & James F. Cotter, ShareholderProposalsin the New Millenium:
ShareholderSupport, BoardResponse, and MarketReaction, 13 J.CoRp. FIN. 368, 388-89 (2007).
65. Id. at 389.
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a view that "shareholders view corporate governance proposals as
connected to firm value and therefore worthy of support, whereas their
66
beliefs about social responsibility proposals are precisely the opposite."
More critically, they also noted: "unlike studies of earlier time periods, for
corporate governance proposals, there are an increasing number of majority
vote supported proposals and a trend toward increased board
responsiveness to these proposals over the 3 years in our sample."67 They
found that "[t]his trend is particularly marked with respect to the removal
of firm68anti-takeover defenses, such as the poison pill and classified
board.1
Other studies have also documented the extent to which precatory
shareholder proposals influence corporate governance structures. 69
Professors Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri, and Stephen Stubben studied
those corporate governance proposals which received the support of a
majority of shareholders, as they believe that such proposals "capture an
unambiguous and unresolved conflict about governance choices between
the board and a significant portion of the shareholder base... [and thus]
represent an ideal setting to explore boards' responsiveness to shareholder
concems." 70 Reviewing a sample of 620 governance-related, majorityapproved proposals (which they term "MV proposals"), they found that
"the likelihood of implementation of MV proposals increases after 2001
and is a function of the degree of shareholder pressure, as measured by the
percentage of votes in favor of the proposal and the influence of the
shareholders submitting and supporting the proposal., 71 Another finding of
the study explains the results, in part: "[t]he implementation of a MV
proposal is associated with approximately a one-fifth reduction in both the
probability of director turnover and the probability of losing other
directorships. 72 They conclude that, "[t]o the extent that the director labor
market penalizes sub-optimal behavior,.
" the study provides indirect
evidence that, on average, shareholder proposals may be an effective
governance mechanism.
Professors Diane Del Guercio, Laura Seery, and Tracie Woidtke also
provide evidence that shareholder voting has an important signaling and
governance effect.74 Although concerned with shareholder voting in
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., Yonca Ertimur et al., Board of Directors' Responsiveness to Shareholders:
Evidencefrom ShareholderProposals,16 J. CORP. FIN. 53, 53 (2010).
70. Id. at 69.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.

74. See Diane Del Guercio et al., Do Boards Pay Attention When InstitutionalInvestor
Activists "Just Vote No "?, 90 J. FN. EcoN. 84, 84 (2008).
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uncontested director elections rather than shareholder proposals, the study
provides evidence that the signaling effect of the proxy process is an
increasingly important governance mechanism. 75 Using a dataset of "just
vote no" campaigns-in which shareholders are encouraged to vote "no"
on the slate of company-sponsored director candidates-spanning from
1990 to 2003, the authors found evidence that activists have been effective
in "prodding boards to either fire an underperforming CEO or to take other
actions consistent with shareholders' interests. 76 In the subsequent oneyear period they also found operating improvements subsequent to these
campaigns and positive stock price reactions to governance changes,
suggesting that the activism is value-enhancing. 77 As further evidence that
both shareholders and directors must reach governance tipping points
before they are inclined to take action, the authors noted that general calls
for structural change as part of broad "good governance" campaigns are not
as effective in producing value-enhancing change as campaigns motivated
by firm-specific strategy and performance issues: "These campaigns are
significantly associated with disciplinary CEO turnover and, most
important, with economically and statistically significant operating
improvements. In contrast, campaigns motivated more by general corporate
governance principles have insignificant changes in operating
performance." These results can be interpreted to support the simple and
intuitive notion that normally and rationally disengaged shareholders will
not respond to broad calls for corporate governance reform. They may,
however, be persuaded to support governance changes when management
has performed poorly.
Del Guercio, Seery, and Woidtke also found that "just vote no"
campaigns may be particularly effective for larger companies. This is due,
in part, to the relatively high cost of other forms of activism, such as a
proxy contest that typically requires a very large and expensive investment
to obtain credibility with other investors. They found these campaigns were
also productive because "the power of the media and public opinion is
most effective when directors have the most to lose" such as in "the
prestigious
and well-compensated board rooms of the very largest public
79
firms."

Other studies have evaluated the stock price impact of shareholder
proposals. 80 Professors Bonnie Buchanan, Jeffry Netter, Annette Poulsen,
75. See id. at 102.

76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., Bonnie Buchanan et al., Are Shareholder Proposals an Important Corporate
Governance Device? Evidence from US and UK Shareholder Proposals 2 (May 30, 2010)
(unpublished manuscript), availableat http://ssm.com/abstract=1 572016.
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and Tina Yang, for example, found that while stock returns are generally
positive in response to a shareholder proposal, stock returns increase as the
81
proposal is perceived to be a mechanism to increase shareholder power.
As supported by other studies, the fact that activist investors are careful in
choosing their targets can explain part of the returns; these investors tend
to look for underperforming companies that governance changes are most
likely to affect. So, for example, the authors found that returns are -9.7%
for the two years preceding the proposing event, but rose to +3.0% when
annualized over the following three years.82 For proposals that increased
shareholder power, the returns83were -9.5% and +4.4%, before and after the
proposing event respectively.
These findings are even more pronounced for holders of significant
blocks-between 1% and 5%-of stock.84 For 1% holders, the authors
found returns of -9.1% in the year prior to the proposal, + 10.8% in the year
of the proposal, and +11.6% in the year after. 85 The numbers were more
impressive for 5% holders. In the year before the proposal, returns were
-2.9% prior to the proposal, rising to8629.7% in the year of the proposal
and settling to 23.7% one year after.
The Buchanan, Netter, Poulsen, and Yang study is also important in
that it documented the increasing importance of shareholder proposals over
time. Additionally, because it compares the U.S. and the U.K. shareholder
proposal regimes, which have different requirements for making proposals,
it "underscores the importance of viewing governance as an interrelated
system and
understanding the identities and incentives of proposal
87
sponsors."
Professors April Klein and Emanuel Zur's 2009 study evaluated the
stock impact of activism by considering the effects of "confrontational
activism campaigns," mounted largely by hedge funds. 88 They found that
targeted firms showed positive abnormal stock returns surrounding the
announcement of a campaign and that this effect varied according to the
identity of the activist.89- Campaigns by hedge funds, a number of which
specialize in activism as a mechanism of generating value and returns,
corresponded with a 10.2% increase in returns in the year the campaign
was announced and an 11.4% increase the following year.90 Campaigns by
81. Id.at 6.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 36-37.
85. Id.at 37.
86. Id.
87. Id.at 47.
88. See April Klein & Emanuel Zur, EntrepreneurialShareholderActivism: Hedge Funds
and Other Private Investors, 64 J. FIN. 187, 187 (2009).
89. Id.at 225.
90. Id.
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other activists as a group were associated with an increase of 5.1% in the
year of the campaign and 17.8% the following year. 91 Klein and Zur argued
that hedge funds primarily produce value by reducing managerial agency
costs associated with excess free cash: "Under this theory, firms can reduce
agency conflicts between managers and shareholders by reducing excess
cash on hand, and by obligating managers to make continuous payouts in
the form of increased dividends and interest payments to creditors." 92 They
found evidence consistent with this view, as the targets of hedge fund
activism initially have higher levels of cash on hand than do firms targeted
by other kinds of "entrepreneurial activists." 93 In addition, they found that:
[H] edge fund activists frequently demand that the target firm
buy back its own shares, cut the CEO's salary, or initiate
dividends, whereas other activists do not make these
demands. Consequently, over the fiscal year following the
initial Schedule 13D, hedge fund targets, on average, double
their dividends, significantly increase their debt-to-assets
ratio, and significantly decrease their cash and short-term
investments.
On the other hand, the other entrepreneurial activists studied by Klein
and Zur tend to not focus on reducing agency costs as much as simply
directing management strategies:
In their initial Schedule 13Ds, they most frequently demand
changes in the targets' operating strategies. Consistent with
these requests, when comparing hedge fund and other
entrepreneurial activist targets, we find significant differences
in changes in R&D and capital expenditures in the year
following the 13D filing, with the other entrepreneurial
activist tarjets experiencing significant declines in both
parameters.
Not all studies have found positive stock price impacts from
shareholder activism. Economists Allan T. Ingraham and Anna Koyfman
from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce's Workforce Freedom Initiative
reviewed a sample of AFL-CIO Key Votes proposals 96 and found no
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id.
Id. at 189.
Id. at 226.
Id. at 189.
Id.
The AFL-CIO has described Key Votes Surveys as follows:
The proposals included in the Key Votes Survey are submitted by Taft-Hartley,
union, and public employee pension funds as well as employee shareholders and
other investors, and are consistent with the AFL-CIO Proxy Voting Guidelines.

These proposals represent a worker-owner view of value that emphasizes
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significant positive short-term or long-term effects from the proposals.97
The results lead Ingraham and Koyfman to question whether it is in the
interest of the beneficiaries of these funds for the fund sponsors to engage
in activism
that, in the aggregate, seemed to have little or no positive
98
effect.

The differences in the findings from the other studies may perhaps be
explained by the fact that the Ingraham and Koyfinan stud' included
shareholder proposals that focused on nongovernance issues. Also, the
Ingraham and Koyfman study included governance proposals that were not
necessarily firm specific, which other studies have suggested is associated
with higher shareholder support and positive stock price impacts.' 00
Like Ingraham and Koyfhman, James Copland-senior fellow at the
conservative-leaning Manhattan Institute-offered a skeptical review of
the value of shareholder proposals. 1 1 Copland evaluated shareholder
proposals between the years 2008 and 2011 and found that 98% of all
shareholder proposals, including those that address nongovemance issues,
such as social proposals, were offered by one of three types of
management accountability and good corporate governance. A score representing
the percentage of support and corresponding tier group categorization are assigned
to each firm to assist trustees in evaluating the relative proxy voting performance
of competing investment managers.
AFL-CIO OFFICE OF INV., AFL-CIO KEY VOTES SURVEY: How INVESTMENT MANAGERS VOTED IN
THE 2012 PROXY SEASON 1, available at http://www.aflcio.org/content/download/70511/
1815441/2012_keyvotes_0313.pdf.
97. ALLAN T. INGRAHAM & ANNA KOYFMAN, WORKFORCE FREEDOM INITIATIVE, ANALYSIS OF
THE WEALTH EFFECTS OF SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS-VOLUME III 19 (2013).
98. Ingraham and Koyfinan previously stated:
Given that costs are likely to be associated with these proposals, it is reasonable to
suggest that, on the whole, the shareholder proposals examined in this study may,
in fact, result in a negative return for those pursuing them. This may hold
particular significance for pension plans, including plans associated with
organized labor. Should there be no reasonable expectation of a financial benefit
from shareholder activism, plan fiduciaries may need to reconsider the extent to
which they engage in this practice.
Id. They also suggest that funds engaging in such activism may be violating their fiduciary duties
under ERISA. Id. at 6.
99. Id. at 5.
100. See, e.g., Thomas & Cotter, supra note 64, at 368-69; Buchanan et al., supra note 80, at
5-6.
101. See JAMES R. COPLAND, CTR. FOR LEGAL POLICY, PROXY MONITOR 2011: A REPORT ON
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM 3 (2011) ("On balance, the empirical
evidence analyzed in this report tends to throw into question the push for 'shareholder democracy'
and suggests that shareholder activism in the form of shareholder proposals submitted on the proxy
ballots of publicly traded companies may be more a vehicle for interest-group capture of
corporations rather than for mitigating agency costs and improving shareholder returns.").
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shareholders. 1° 2 In order of importance, these include: (1) individual
"corporate gadflies," who file multiple substantially similar shareholder
proposals at many companies; 0 3 (2) labor union pension funds (both
public and private sector); and (3) social investment funds,04typically
affiliated with religious organizations or public policy groups.
Copland found that manufacturing companies tend to receive many
more shareholder proposals than technology companies, and energy and
financial services companies also tend to receive proportionately higher
numbers of shareholder proposals. 0 5 Shareholder proposals at retailers
were more likely to receive majority approval. 106 Proposals also vary over
07
time, often as regulatory changes make some popular proposals moot.'
For instance, proposals dealing with executive compensation decreased
dramatically in 2011 after advisory votes on management pay and golden
parachutes were required under Dodd-Frank.10 8 Furthermore, proposals
dealing with corporate governance matters were most likely to be
successful while proposals dealing with0social
issues were least likely to
9
receive significant shareholder support.1
Finally, Copland noted that labor unions often appear to use shareholder
proposals as leverage in disputes with management, focusing proposals "at
companies that are in industrial sectors publicly targeted by union
organizing campaigns."' 110 Additionally, "[labor-affiliated funds'
shareholder proposals also tend to focus on executive compensation and
the separation of the chairman and CEO position for companies," both
management-sensitive topics." 1
The Parts below build on these studies to develop a more complete
picture of shareholder voting. First, this Article reviews recent shareholder
voting behavior and then develops a theory based on this evidence to
provide a robust understanding of shareholder behavior.

M.

TRENDS IN SHAREHOLDER VOTING:

2003-2013

This Part reviews voting trends for major corporate governance
proposals over the last eleven years. The data come from annual reports on
102. Id. at 2.
103. Copland notes that "more than two-thirds of all proposals submitted to Fortune 150
companies by individual investors came from Evelyn Davis and members of the Steiner,
Chevedden, and Rossi families." Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 10.
107. Id. at 2-3.
108. Id.

109. Id. at 3.
110. Id. Copland's finding reinforces similar findings discussed by Professor Ashwini K.
Agrawal. Cf Ashwini K. Agrawal, Corporate Governance Objectives of Labor Union
Shareholders:Evidencefrom Proxy Voting, 25 REv. FIN. STuD. 187, 187-88 (2012).
111.

COPLAND, supra note 101, at 3.
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corporate governance proposals prepared annually by Georgeson
Shareholder, a large proxy solicitor." 2 The data help to answer a
fundamental question in corporate governance: What do shareholders value
in corporate governance? Professors James Hawley and Andrew Williams
have argued that many large institutional investors are "universal
owners"-their holdings become so extensive across the markets that they
cannot escape bad governance by selling their shares. 13 Under this theory
such investors would be more attentive to governance issues generally and
more likely to focus on shareholder proposals specifically as a means to
exercise their preferences on governance issues.
There are, to be sure, a large number of investors-particularly retail
investors-who do not actively vote their shares. If brokers held these
shares,' 14 the brokers historically had the discretion to vote on behalf of the
beneficial shareholders for "routine" corporate governance matters, except
in cases in which the shareholders instructed the brokers how they wanted
their shares voted.' 15 For reasons of convenience, or in some cases perhaps
because of conflicts of interest, brokers have traditionally voted with
management. 116 As a result, broker discretionary voting has been seen as a
bulwark against shareholder proposal activism and is therefore a target of
those seeking to expand shareholder rights." 7 As shareholder activists have
pushed for modifications to the national exchanges' voting policies over
the years, the NYSE has enacted several changes to its broker discretionary
voting rules. These changes include the elimination of broker discretionary
1
voting on the following: equity compensation plans, in 2003; 8
112. See GEORGESON SHAREHOLDER, supra note 12.
113. JAMES P. HAWLEY & ANDREW T. WILLIAMS, THE RISE OF FIDUCIARY CAPITALISM: How

INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS CAN MAKE CORPORATE AMERICA MORE DEMOCRATIC 22 (2000).
114. According to the law firm Wilson, Sonsini, Goodrich & Rosati, "[i]t is estimated that as
much as 70 to 80 percent of the shares of U.S. public companies are held in street name and
managed by brokers." WSGR Alert: SEC EliminatesDiscretionaryBroker Votingfor Uncontested
Director

Elections,

WILSON

SONSlNI

GOODRICH

&

ROSATI

(July

15,

2009),

http://www.wsgr.com/WSGR/Display.aspx?SectionName=publications/PDFSearch/wsgralert-ru
le452 amendment.htm.
115. Rule 452.

Giving Proxies by

Member Organization, NYSE,

available at

http://nyserules.nyse.com/NYSETools/PlatformViewer.asp?searched= 1&selectednode=chp_1_5
12 4&CiRestriction=proxy&manual=%o2Fnyse%2Frules%2Fnyse-rules%2F. For a brief history of
broker discretionary voting by the Proxy Working Group, see Report and Recommendations ofthe
Proxy Working Group to the New York Stock Exchange, NYSE 7-10 (2006), available at
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/REVISEDNYSEReport 6_5 06.pdf.
116. Lisa M. Fairfax, MandatingBoard-ShareholderEngagement?, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 821,
827 ("[S]tudies indicate that broker discretionary voting overwhelmingly follows management.
Hence, shareholders contended that such voting distorted election outcomes and undermined
shareholder influence." (footnote omitted)).
117. Id.
118. Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 45,108, 80 SEC Docket 1596
(June 30, 2003).
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uncontested director elections, in 2010; 119 and, in 2012, a number of other
corporate governance matters such as "proposals to de-stagger the board of

directors, majority voting in the election of directors, eliminating
supermajority voting requirements, providing for the use of consents,
providing rights to call a special meeting, and certain types of anti-takeover
provision overrides."' 2 °

The effect of these changes to the exchange rules is a clear win for
supporters of shareholder primacy; more pragmatically, the changes

particularly benefit the corporate governance and proxy advisory industry,
which influences the voting of many institutional investors. Work by
Professors Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch, and Marcel Kahan indicates that most
institutional investors use proxy advisors as data compilers rather than
following their advice blindly, although there is a small percentage of
investors who give proxy advisors the power to vote the investors' shares

119. Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 60,215, 96 SEC Docket 654
(July 1, 2009). This was later codified by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act. See Martin Gelter, Taming or Protectingthe Modern Corporation?ShareholderStakeholderDebates in a ComparativeLight, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 641, 656 (2011).
120. Memorandum from NYSE Regulation to All NYSE and NYSE Amex Equities Members
and Member Orgs. (Jan. 25, 2012), available at http://www.nyse.com/nysenotices/nyse/
information-memos/detail?memoid=12-4. Sullivan & Cromwell notes the irony of the rule changes
outlined in the memorandum:
Because retail shareholders often do not provide instructions to vote their shares,
the NYSE interpretive change removes a significant number of "for" votes from
the voting pool. In 2012, this did not have a significant impact on the support for
these proposals measured as a percentage of votes cast - virtually all shares that
were voted continued to be in favor of these proposals. It did, however, have a
significant impact on the support for these proposals measured as a percentage of
total shares outstanding,which is the measurement that generally applies as a
state law matter in the case of a charter amendment. Many companies have a
requirement in their charter that certain amendments must be approved by the
affirmative vote of a supermajority (often two-thirds or 80%) of shares
outstanding. For these companies, it was significantly more likely in 2012 that a
management proposal for a charter amendment that is seen by shareholders as a
governance enhancement will nevertheless fail to receive the vote necessary to
effect the charter amendment.
For example, in 2012 the average level of shareholder support for management
proposals to eliminate supermajority voting provisions (which the company was
proposing, in many cases, in response to a successful shareholder proposal in an
earlier year) was 70% of shares outstanding, compared to 84% in 2011, with the
difference being attributable almost entirely to fewer shares being voted. In 2012,
these management proposals to eliminate supermajority voting failed at eight
companies, double the number from 2011.
2012 Proxy Season Review, SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP 11-12 (July 9, 2012),
http://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/2012_ProxySeasonReview-7-20-2012.pdf.
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according to the proxy advisors' criteria. 2 ' It follows then, that (at least
prior to 2013) there is on one hand a large group of investors who likely
either do not pay attention to shareholder proposals or outsource their
corporate governance voting to brokers and who arguably tend to vote with
management. On the other hand, there is a small group of shareholders
who outsource their corporate governance voting to proxy advisors but
tend to take positions against management on corporate governance
matters. There is also a substantial group of shareholders between these
two poles that are "persuadable" shareholder voters. As explained by
Professors Ronald J. Gilson and Jeffrey N. Gordon, most shareholdersparticularly many large, institutional investors such as mutual funds-are
rationally reticent to support governance changes. 122 Some institutional
investors and governance entrepreneurs such as activist hedge funds and
proxy advisors seek to persuade these reticent investors of the case for
change:
Such actors would develop the skills to identify strategic and
governance
shortfalls
with
significant
valuation
consequences, to acquire a position in a company with
governance-related underperformance, and then to present
reticent institutions with their value proposition .... Once the
issue is framed and presented, the undervaluation of
governance rights is reduced: The institutions will vote (or
indicate willingness to vote) in favor of the specialized actors'
23
perspective if the issue is framed in a compelling way.1
Similar to political voting, a large central group of voters is not
irrevocably and ideologically committed to one side or the other. They will
cast their votes opportunistically for whichever side presents the most
compelling arguments or simply offers a change from past policies. 24 And,
like attitudes towards political issues, shareholders show rapid shifts in
support for various shareholder proposals. 125 As this Article will
demonstrate through the data described below, shareholders increasingly
value their governance rights and their support for numerous shareholder
rights issues is strengthening.
121. See Stephen Choi et al., The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?, 59 EMORY L. J.

869, 884-85 (2010).
122. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 13, at 867.
123. Id. at 896.
124. See Harris, supra note 52, at 1763 (arguing that shareholder voting is "not dissimilar to
citizen voting in elections for public office" and that shareholders will typically vote "for or against
directors based on those directors' expected performance or ability to maximize firm value").
125. For example, Pew Research reports that in 2001 Americans opposed same-sex marriage
by a 57% to 35% margin. By 2013, the percentages had flipped in the other direction, with 54% of
Americans in favor of same-sex marriage, and only 39% opposed. See ChangingAttitudes on Gay
Marriage,PEW RES. (June 2013), http://features.pewforum.org/same-sex-marriage-attitudes/. As
shown below, similar rapid shifts have occurred in relatively brief periods of time in shareholder
voting.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss6/5

22

Barnett: Is Injury a Tortious Act?: Interpreting Florida's Long-Arm Statut
SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALSIN THE MARKETFOR CORPORATEINFLUENCE

The reasons for these shifts are not entirely endogenous, however.
Indeed, the increasing interest in proxy voting in particular is the intended
result of regulatory changes that have encouraged institutional investors to
take a more active role in corporate governance, 126 including a rule under
the Investment Advisers Act that requires investment advisers such as
mutual funds to vote proxies in the best interests of the fund
shareholders, 127 and the Department of Labor's similar imposition of
fiduciary duties on pension fund managers.128 The SEC has pursued several
other initiatives to promote more active shareholder engagement in
corporate governance, including a loosening of rules governing proxy
communications among shareholders and rules requiring the disclosure of
proxy voting by investment companies. The whittling down of broker
discretionary voting has likely had a significant effect on support for
corporate governance proposals.
A. The New Era of CorporateGovernance Proposals:2003-2013
The time period discussed in this Article marks an important shift in
shareholder activism. In 2003, there was a 56% jump in the number of
corporate goverance proposals, from 273 proposals in 2002 to 427 in
2003.129 Many of the proposals were offered in reaction to corporate
scandals and were dropped because of regulatory changes. 130 As a general
matter, corporate governance proposals tend to be "trendy": many become
relatively popular quickly, but just as quickly fade away. However, while
governance trends come and go, 2003 marked a significant shift in the use
of shareholder proposals as a tool of corporate governance. Undoubtedly,
the jump in proposals in 2003 is largely attributable to heightened attention
on governance issues after there were numerous indictments and civil
charges filed in 2002 and 2003 against executives, accountants, and
bankers from Adelphia Communications, Arthur Andersen, Charter
Communications, Credit Suisse, Dynegy, Enron, HealthSouth, Merrill
Lynch, Qwest Communications, Rite Aid, Tyco International, and
WorldCom, among others; it is also clearly attributable to the passage of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in July 2002.131
126. See Rose, supra note 14, at 1356 (noting that courts and regulators have promoted
shareholder influence through "various decisions and regulatory actions" (footnote omitted)).
127. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 l(g)(1) (2012).
128. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, MEETING YOUR FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITIES 1-2 (Feb. 2012),
available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/meetingyourfiduciaryresponsibilities.pdf.
129. GEORGESON SHAREHOLDER, ANNUAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVEW: SHAREHOLDER
PROPOSALS AND PROXY CONTESTS i (2003), available at http://www.computersharena.com/sharedweb/georgeson/acgr/acgr2003.pdf.
130. Id. at ii-iii.
131. See MARK JICKLING & PAUL H. JANov, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31866 CRiMINAL
CHARGES IN CORPORATE SCANDALS (2004), available at http://royce.house.gov/uploadedfiles/

r131866.pdf.
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Looking beyond the initial jump, over the eleven years from 2003-2013
as illustrated in Figure 1, shareholder proposals decreased gradually from
2003-2008, rose again in 2009, and again experienced a decline from
2009-2011. The period from 2011-2013 appears relatively steady. The
decline in proposals from 2008-2013 has several main drivers. First, as
discussed in detail below, some proposals are quite successful, and so there
are simply fewer companies that are targeted by governance activists in
subsequent years. Trendy proposals often fail and may not be brought up
again. Finally, shareholders and managers are increasingly engaging in
behind-the-scenes negotiations; again, this is likely due to the success of
both shareholder governance intiatives as well as event-driven hedge
funds, each of which may increase managerial willingness to engage with
shareholders.
Figure 1: Total Corporate Governance Proposals, 2003-2013
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B. Types of CorporateGovernance Proposals
The following charts categorize the various types of corporate
governance-related shareholder proposals over the period studied, showing
the number of proposals of each type that were submitted and came to a
vote, the years in which the proposals came to a vote, and the range 3of
2
support, as a percentage of total outstanding shares, for the proposals.
132. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. Proposals regarding executive compensation
are not included in this summary although a significant number of executive compensation
proposals are submitted every year. This Article focuses on a narrow set of corporate governance
proposals. Executive compensation proposals operate as a separate category of proposals, as do
social issue proposals, for several reasons. First, while they play an important signaling effect for
underperforming firms, they do not directly affect the power allocation between directors and
shareholders. Second, even more than corporate governance proposals, they tend to be short-lived
and "trendy" because of regulatory implementation. Finally (and related to regulatory
implementation), executive compensation proposals have become less prominent over the last few
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PROXY-ACCESS-RELATED PROPOSALS:
Number of Proposals
Submitted,
2003-2013

Year(s) Proposal
Came to a Vote

Range of Votes in
Favor as a Percentage of Shares
Outstanding

Adopt Proxy Access' 33

17

2012-13

42%

Allow Shareholders to
Recover
Proxy Access
13 4

5

2010

40%

Number of Proposals
Submitted,
2003-2013
5

Year(s) Proposal
Came to a Vote

Range of Votes in Favor as a
Percentage of Shares Outstanding

30

2003-04

Proposal

Costs

AUDIT-RELATED PROPOSALS':
Proposal

Shareholder Approval of
AUditors
,
No Consulting by
Auditors

RLimit Non-Audites ee
Rotate Auditors

6
12003

2004-05

,

43'44%
10-12%

200F
3%

years. Shareholders submitted 166 proposals relating to executive compensation in 2003, but only
116 in 2010, 40 in 2011, and 59 in 2012.
133. Shareholder proposals calling for the company to adopt a proxy access rule emerged in
2012 as a response to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia decision that voided
the SEC's proxy access rule, Rule 14a-1 1. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1156 (D.C. Cir.
2011). The SEC's rule would have given qualified shareholders the ability to submit a limited
number of director candidates to be run on the company's ballot. Id. at 1147.
134. In 2009, Delaware General Corporation Law was amended with respect to reimbursement
of shareholder expenses. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 113 (2009). These amendments permitted
companies to adopt a bylaw provision to reimburse shareholders who have incurred expenses in
connection with their solicitation of proxies for director elections. Id. § 113(a).
135. Audit proposals began to appear in 2002 as shareholders sought to reduce the risk of
auditing abuse that took place in Enron and other scandals, but ceased after 2005 because
Sarbanes-Oxley and the SEC rules promulgated thereunder mandated rules that accomplished much
of what shareholders had proposed. Joseph Mead, Confidence in the Nonprofit Sector Through
Sarbanes-Oxley-Style Reforms, 106 MICH. L. REV. 881, 888 & n.51 (2008).
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BOARD-RELATED PROPOSALS:
Proposal
Number of Proposals
Submitted,
2003-2013

Adopt and Disclose CEO
Succession Planning
Guilnes

~

Range of Votes in Favor as a
Percentage of Shares Outstanding

4

2010

17%

4

2006

29%

___________

Advisory Vote on
Compensation
Committee Report
Dule Board
Establish Committee on
Human Rights
Establish Committee on
Mortgage, Lending
Establish Committee on
Sustainability
Establish Outside

Year(s) Proposal
Came to a Vote

19

___

-_----2003-04, 2008

7

2008

3

2008

3-5%
2%

_______

3

2008
20.0

~Director QualificationsHire Independent
Compensation
Consultant

3

Independent Board
Chairman/Separate
37
Chair-CEo'
Independent
Director/Shareholder

4

2007

26%

2003-13

18-27%

2004

5%

2008-09

18-25%

2003-06

3-13%
11%

Dialogue.
Independent Lead

7

D irector T
Limit Director Tenure 139

203

21

Limit Number of

-

2007

136. These proposals seek to nominate two director candidates for each open board seat. They
emerged in 2003 and lasted two years before disappearing and then re-emerging in 2008.
137. Independent board chairman or separate chair/CEO proposals have appeared on company
ballots for thirteen of the last seventeen years. In 2003, these proposals earned 18% approval, and
reached an apex of 27% in 2012. None of the years from 2003-2013 showed a dramatic increase
over the prior year.
138. Appointing a lead director is an alternative to splitting the chairman/CEO role. Generally,
the lead director "serves as an independent chief among all board members and thereby helps ensure
board
relations
run smoothly."
Defining the Lead Director Role, PWC,
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/view/issue- 13/defining-the-lead-director-role.jhtml. (last visited Sept.
19, 2014).
139. Proposals seeking to limit director tenure appeared on corporate ballots in four years,
from 2003-2006, and received low support, 3-13% approval as a percentage of shares outstanding.
It is unclear why these proposals died, but their demise may be due to four consecutive years of low
support. Occasionally, management proposals appear that seek to limit outside director terms.
Unsurprisingly, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) advises shareholders to "[v]ote AGAINST
management and shareholder proposals to limit the tenure of outside directors ....
2013 US.
Proxy Voting Summary Guidelines, INSTITUTIONAL S'HOLDER SERVS. INC. 17 (Dec. 19, 2012),
http://www.issgovernance.com/files/ISS2013USSummaryGuidelines.pdf.
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Majority Independent

17

2003-05

16-21%

363

2004-13

9-47%

166

2006-13

32-36%

130

2006-13

43-59%

11

2006-08

17-31%

Directors 4 °

MajorityVote to Elect
,Lirectors'"Majority Vote to Elect
Directors - Have

Implemented a Form of
Majority Voting
Majority Vote to Elect
Directors- Have Not
Implemented a Form of
_Maj ority Voting
Majority VoteShareholder 2
Committee

2011-1313

J oniinate-1irector w'ith-

EnivironmentalJ
Repeal1 4Classified

410

2003-13

45-64%

Board,

140. Proposals seeking to require a company to compose its board with a majority of
independent directors were first introduced in 1999, initially receiving 30% approval as a
percentage of shares outstanding. The proposal then disappeared from corporate ballots until 2003,
when it reemerged with decreased support at only 16%. Support then increased slightly to 23% and
21% in 2004 and 2005 respectively. The proposal again disappeared from corporate ballots because
NYSE and NASDAQ began requiring that listed companies have a board with a majority of
independent directors. See Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 68,639,2013
WL 166322 (Jan. 11, 2013); Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 68,640,
2013 WL 166323 (Jan. 11, 2013).
141. Majority voting proposals emerged in 2004, earning only 9% of votes as a percentage of
shares outstanding. Only one year later, that numberjumped to 33% and continued to rise, reaching
46% in 2012. Majority voting proposals for companies that had not implemented a form of majority
voting were the most popular of this group, earning 43-70% approval as a percentage of shares
outstanding. Even proposals for companies that had already implemented a form of majority voting
earned support of 32-48%. The cause of the proliferation of these votes in 2005 is two-fold. First,
activists were disappointed that SEC proposed Rule 14a- 11-the proxy access rule that would have
given shareholders the ability to nominate candidates and have them listed on the company's proxy
card-had not been implemented. Second, activists were frustrated that a number of their successful
resolutions concerning de-staggering the board and poison pill rescission votes were being ignored.
These shareholders were looking for a more direct way to hold directors accountable.
142. Proposals seeking to create a shareholder committee to address proposals that receive a
majority of shareholder votes appeared on company ballots from 2006-2008 and received moderate
support. These proposals received 25% and 31% for vote as a percentage of shares outstanding in
2006 and 2007, and then support dropped to 17% in 2008.
143. These proposals seek to require that one director with environmental expertise be elected
to the board, As other commentators have stated, "[t]here is a growing demand for specific expertise
to assist with the ever-increasing complex business issues such as ...environmental expertise."
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A SYNTHESiS OF THEORY, RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 257 (H. Kent Baker

& Ronald Anderson eds., 2010).
144. By far the most supported and longstanding board-related shareholder proposals are those
seeking to repeal a company's classified board. Declassification proposals have come to a vote
every year for decades and have seen steady increases in support over the years.
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VOTING RIGHTS-RELATED PROPOSALS:
Number of
Proposal
Proposals
Submitted,
2003-2013
45
201
umulatve Voting'
159
Eliminate or Reduce
Supermajority
46

Year(s) Proposal
Came to a Vote

Range of Votes in Favor as a
Percentage of Shares Outstanding

2W3-13
2004-13

1 -28%
46-57%

Provision

I Shareholder Right to Act
~by~rittenConsent' 4

94

2010-13

34-4 ,

Shareholder Right to Call
48
Special Meeting

170

2008-13

29-36%

145. Shareholders have consistently given moderate support to cumulative voting proposals
since 2003. However, these proposals rarely gain a majority vote in any one company. As other
commentators have noted, this proposal may be "fundamentally at odds with majority voting, in that
it allows the election of directors that are not supported by a majority of the voted shares."
SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 120, at 11. However, support for cumulative voting
proposals has not been noticeably affected by increasing support of majority voting proposals.
146. These proposals seek to eliminate or reduce the votes a corporation's charter or bylaws
require to remove directors, amend the charter or bylaws, or approve major transactions, etc.
Generally, supermajority provisions were enacted as takeover defenses in the hostile takeover
market of the 1980s. See, e.g., William C. Tyson, The ProperRelationship Between Federaland
State Law in the Regulation of Tender Offers, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 241, 309 (1990)
(characterizing supermajority requirements as "measures taken by a target's board of directors that
are designed to forestall a hostile offer"). More recently, shareholders have sought to remove these
provisions and others that make it "more likely that management proposals for governance changes
would fail, even if they were seen as governance enhancements by shareholders in general."
SULLIVAN &CROMWELL LLP, supra note 120, at 11. These proposals continue to be well supported,
receiving 69% approval as a percentage of shares outstanding in 2012.
147. These proposals seek to give shareholders the right to approve certain corporate matters
without having to call a meeting of shareholders or give notice. Under Delaware law, the default
standard is to allow shareholders to act by written consent. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 228 (2009).
Interestingly, a number of these proposals targeted companies that already provided shareholders
with the right to call a special meeting. In 2011, these proposals experienced their first decline in
support, falling to 48% in 2011 from 54% in 2010.
148. This proposal has become a tool for shareholder activists targeting anti-takeover
provisions. These proposals seek to implement a shareholder's right to call a meeting if one does
not exist, and to lower the threshold of shares necessary to call a special meeting where the right
already exists.
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POISON PILL-RELATED PROPOSALS 4 9:
Proposal
Number of
Proposals
Submitted,
2003-2013

Year(s) Proposal
Came to a Vote

Range of Votes in Favor as a
Percentage of Shares
Outstanding

SRestrictions on or
Redemptions of Poison

189

2003-09

18-28%

Poison Pills - Do Not
Use Preferred Stock

2

2006-07

12-37%

Poison Pills - Redeem or
Vote on

24

2006-07

29-36%

pison Pills -Rescissicii

155

2

42-44%

~Pills_

[__Poinlls-PlPoiy3_

i%

_

3-

_

From these tables, it is clear that there are a relatively small number of
proposals that matter to shareholders year after year, and that generate
correspondingly significant approval ratings. Many proposals are shortlived and only appear for a few years before disappearing from corporate
ballots. This is often due to the operation of Exchange Act Rule 14a8(i)(12), which states that if a proposal deals with "substantially the same
subject matter as another proposal or proposals that has or have been
previously included in the company's proxy materials within the preceding
5 calendar years," a company may exclude the proposal from its proxy
materials for the following 3 calendar years, if the proposal received:
(i)

Less than 3% of the vote if proposed once within the
preceding 5 calendar years;

(ii)

Less than 6% of the vote on its last submission to
shareholders if proposed twice previously within the
preceding 5 calendar years; or

(iii)

Less than 10% of the vote on its last submission to
shareholders if proposed three times or more previously
1 50
within the preceding 5 calendar years.

Several trends in voting emerge from considering which proposals do
not tend to survive, meaning they fail to receive significant support over
149. Proposals relating to a company's poison pill were a subject for shareholder activism long
before 2003, and continued to be well supported until such proposals ended after 2009. The most
consistently well-supported proposals are those seeking to rescind a company's poison pill (20032005, 42-44%). The least supported proposals relating to poison pills were those seeking to change
a company's pill-use policy (2007, 7%). In recent years, the number of poison-pill-related proposals
has decreased, and since 2006 Georgeson Shareholder has treated most poison-pill-related
proposals as one category.
150. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(12) (2012).
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multiple years and therefore are blocked by the operation of Rule 14a8(i)(12). There are a number of proposals listed above that failed to achieve
even 10% support in any year in which they were proposed. Some of these
proposals are essentially a form of social proposal, such as requests that the
board establish committees on human rights or sustainability. Others focus
on narrow issues that tend to impose restrictions on director authority for
decision-making, such as a requirement establishing a committee on
mortgage lending, setting parameters for dialogue with shareholders,
rotating auditors, setting out specific qualifications for outside directors, or
creating a specific poison-pill policy.
A large number of proposals receive relatively significant levels of
support-at least enough to avoid exclusion on the basis of Rule 14a8(i)(12)-but are not submitted at large numbers of firms. This may be the
case because the proposals tend to be reactionary in nature, i.e., they are
designed to focus on specific agency costs at particular firms. For example,
several firms have received proposals that focus on issues related to board
supervision of executive compensation, including proposals to hire an
independent compensation committee consultant and to hold an advisory
vote on the board's compensation committee report, which received 26%
and 29% support respectively. At least one proposal that has received
significant support-to adopt proxy access for shareholders, which was
submitted to only six firms but received an average approval of 40%--will
likely be broadly submitted if the SEC does not propose another proxy
access rule.
There are a large number of proposals that fall in between these two
groups. They have enough support to avoid exclusion under 14a-8(i)(12),
but insufficient support to draw significant action from directors. These
include:
*

Audit-related proposals to require shareholder
approval of auditors, to prohibit consulting by
auditors, and to limit nonaudit fees;
Board-related proposals to adopt and disclose CEO
succession planning guidelines, to appoint an
independent lead director, to limit director tenure, to
limit the number of directorships a board member
may hold, to create a majority-vote shareholder
committee, and to nominate a director with
environmental expertise; and
Poison pill proposals to limit the use of blank-check
preferred stock and to require redemption of poison
pills or a shareholder vote approving the use of poison
pills.
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What remains are those proposals that receive significant support and
tend to appear year-in and year-out on corporate proxy ballots. The
following proposals have appeared at least twenty times each year in which
they have been submitted, and they tend to receive significant support20% or more-from the outstanding shares of the companies at which they
are submitted. These include proposals to:
" Repeal a classified board of directors;
" Appoint an independent chairman or separate the
board chairman and CEO positions;
"

Require a majority vote to elect directors;

•

Create a cumulative voting system;

•

Redeem poison pills;

•

Eliminate or reduce supermajority voting requirement
provisions in the charter;

•

Provide shareholders with the right to act by written
consent; and

•

Provide shareholders with the right to call a special
meeting.

These eight types of proposals have been the most important in the last
ten years. As with other proposals, there is some variability in the
popularity of the proposals from year to year, with some fading (poison pill
redemptions, for example), and others recently appearing on the scene
(proposals to give shareholders the right to call a special meeting and the
right to act by written consent). The following charts focus on these eight
proposal types, showing how often the proposals were submitted, and the
percentage of support each proposal received
from the total outstanding
1 51
voted.
shares
total
the
from
shares and
Proposals to repeal classified boards of directors, shown in Figure 2,
have been submitted regularly over the entire period, and have generally
received increasing support from shareholders. Declassification proposals
151. Because many shareholders do not vote their shares, the support for shareholder proposals
is often higher as a percentage of the total number of shares voted, rather than the total number of
shares outstanding. This is especially true for issues that are promoted as universal "good
governance" proposals, as has been the case with several of these eight proposals. The charts show
the difference between the two measures.
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seem to have had significant effect on board structure, as the number of
classified boards among S&P 100 companies has decreased from over 40%
in 2004152to 7% in 2011, but "rebounded" to 13% in the 2012 proxy
season.

Figure 2. Proposals to Repeal Classified Boards of Directors
Repeal Classified Board
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Although proposals to create an independent chair or to separate the
chair and CEO role, shown in Figure 3, have appeared for a number of
years on corporate proxies, shareholders have been decidedly less
supportive of such proposals relative to declassification. Approval of these
proposals by the total outstanding shares has never risen above 30%.

152. CorporateGovernancePracticesandTrends: A ComparisonofLarge Public Companies
and Silicon Valley Companies, FENWICK & WEST LLP 26 (2012) [hereinafter Corporate
GovernancePracticesand Trends], http://www.fenwick.com/FenwickDocuments/2012-CorporateGovernance-Survey.pdf.
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Figure 3. Proposals for an Independent Chair or to Separate Chair
and CEO
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Cumulative voting, shown in Figure 4, has also been regularly proposed
over the years, but as with chair independence proposals, support for
cumulative voting has never been strong. Cumulative voting is primarily a
minority protection device that would enable shareholders to potentially
appoint and elect directors to the board. 13For reasons explained in more
detail in Part TV, shareholders are rationally reluctant to support proposals that
would empower other investors. In addition, cumulative voting is typically
shareholdings and there are a
only useful where shareholders have substantial
1 54
large number of board seats available.
153. As described by the SEC:
Cumulative voting is a type of voting process that helps strengthen the ability of
minority shareholders to elect a director. This method allows shareholders to cast
all of their votes for a single nominee for the board of directors when the company
has multiple openings on its board. In contrast, in "regular" or "statutory" voting,
shareholders may not give more than one vote per share to any single nominee.
For example, if the election is for four directors and you hold 500 shares (with one
vote per share), under the regular method you could vote a maximum of 500
shares for any one candidate (giving you 2,000 votes total - 500 votes per each of
the four candidates). With cumulative voting, you could choose to vote all 2,000
votes for one candidate, 1,000 each to two candidates, or otherwise divide your
votes whichever way you wanted.
Cumulative Voting, U.S. SEC. & ExCH. COMM'N, http://www.sec.gov/answers/cumulativevote.htm
(last visited Sept. 19, 2014).
154. Cumulative voting only benefits significant block-holders. For example, if there are
twelve seats available, electing a single director would require 9% of the total outstanding shares.
See, e.g., Cumulative Voting Calculator,LAW JOCK PLLC, http://www.lawjock.com/tools/cumulat
ive-voting-calculator/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2014). For a general legal and mathematical discussion
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Figure 4. Cumulative Voting Proposals
Cumulative Voting
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Majority vote proposals, shown in Figure 5, have been one of the
more successful types of shareholder proposals over the last ten years.
Among S&P 100 companies, only 10% of companies had implemented
some form of majority voting as of 2004. By 2011, however, this
number rose to 90%.155 The success of majority vote provisions likely
explains the decrease in the number of proposals; as the number of firms
that have adopted majority voting increases, there are fewer targets for
majority voting proposals.

of cumulative voting, see generally Lewis R. Mills, The Mathematics of Cumulative Voting, 1968
DuKE L.J. 28 (demonstrating mathematical errors in Arthur T. Cole, Jr.'s formulation of cumulative
voting and discussing a more accurate mathematical approach for determining how to elect
corporate directors in a cumulative voting contest); see also Arthur T. Cole, Legal and
MathematicalAspects of Cumulative Voting, 2 S.C. L.Q. 225 (1950) (explaining mathematical
formulas used to address the problems involved in the computation of cumulative votes).
155. Corporate GovernancePracticesand Trends, supra note 152, at 25. Fenwick's survey
also follows the governance practices at Silicon Valley firms (the "Silicon Valley 150" or
"SV150"), and Fenwick finds that:
Among the SV 150 the rate [of majority voting] has risen from none as recently as
the 2005 proxy season to slightly more than 4 in 10 in the 2012 proxy season
(increasing about 5% from the 2011 proxy season). Our data shows that within the
SV 150, the rate of adoption fairly closely tracks with the size of company
(measured by revenue), with an approximately 73% rate among the top 15 (similar
to the S&P 100) and an approximately 18% rate among the bottom 50 in the 2012
proxy season.
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Figure 5. Majority Voting Proposals
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Another type of proposal that has been a victim of its own successindeed, has disappeared entirely in the last three years-is the poison pill
redemption proposal, shown in Figure 6. The number of proposals
decreased from over eighty in 2004 to a handful in 2008 and 2009. At the
same time, shareholders showed significant interest in such proposals.
Approval as a percentage of outstanding shares held between 40-50% in
2003-2005, dipped below 40% between 2006 and 2008, then rebounded in
2009 to 58%.
Figure 6. Proposals to Redeem Poison Pills
Redemptions of Poison Pills
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Two relatively new types of proposals are those that seek to give
shareholders (1) the right to call special meetings, Figure 7; and (2) the
right to act by written consent, Figure 8. In recent years, these proposals
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have been submitted at a significant number of companies and have
received moderate support, though significantly less support than that
received by most of the other eight major types of proposals. Both of these
proposals can theoretically be used to break down a firm's takeover
defenses.
Under § 228 of the Delaware General Corporation Law, "[u]nless
otherwise provided in the certificate of incorporation," any action required
by Delaware law to be taken at any annual or special meeting of
stockholders of a corporation (such as removing directors),
may be taken without a meeting, without prior notice and
without a vote, if a consent or consents in writing, setting
forth the action so taken, shall be signed by the holders of
outstanding stock having not less than the minimum number
of votes156that would be necessary to authorize or take such
action.
Thus, as practitioners have noted, if a corporation's charter is silent on
whether consents may be solicited,
an activist shareholder can use a consent solicitation to
remove all of the members of the board of directors and to
effectively assume control of the company without paying the
control premium that would typically be expected to be paid
to the company's shareholders if he were acquiring a
controlling interest in the company. In fact, the activist
shareholder can theoretically commence a consent solicitation
and gain control even if he holds only one share of the
company. In effect, if the company's shareholders can take
action by written consent, a narrow constituency of
shareholders can initiate an unlimited number of consent
solicitations whenever
157 they deem it beneficial to advancing
their own interests.
The circumstances of a consent solicitation at Six Flags Entertainment
Corp. show how the right to act by written consent can be used to great
156. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 228 (2009). As practitioners have noted, bylaw changes are
insufficient to prevent consent solicitations: "From time to time, companies adopt bylaws that
provide that actions by written consent are not permitted. Those bylaw provisions are generally of
no effect since Section 228 specifically provides that actions by written consent are permitted unless
such right is specifically denied in the certificate of incorporation." Barry H. Genkin et al., Ten
Ways to Preventa Companyfrom Being Vulnerable to a ConsentSolicitation,M&A LAwYER, May
2008, at 1, 3-4.
157. Id.at 3. Professors Barry Genkin, Keith Gottfiied, and John Jones also note that "[w]hile
a consent solicitation may superficially seek to hold directors accountable, it often only holds them
accountable for not acting in the best interests of the activist shareholder who is seeking to acquire a
level of influence that is disproportionate to the size of his investment in the company." Id.
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effect.1 58 In 2005, an activist hedge fund holding just 11.7% of Six Flags'
outstanding stock solicited consents from other shareholders and succeeded
in obtaining sufficient consents to remove three nonindependent directors
from the company's board, including the chairman of the board and the
chief executive officer. 159 Because boards are vulnerable to consent
solicitations, approximately 70% of firms have put some kind of restriction
on actions by written consent through
an outright prohibition or by
160
requiring consent to be unanimous.
Despite the effective use of a consent solicitation at Six Flags,
Professors Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Allen Ferrell suggest that
neither the right to act by written consent nor the right to call a special
meeting may be particularly effective as entrenchment devices:
[T]here is evidence that limits on special meeting and written
consent do not have a statistically significant effect on the
outcome of hostile bids. Such limits prevent shareholders
from voting between annual meetings and require them to
wait until the annual meeting to conduct any vote, but the
practical significance of the required delay is limited. Even
when shareholders can act by written consent or call a special
meeting, the rules governing proxy solicitations are likely to
impose some delay before a vote can be conducted. And
waiting until the next annual
61 meeting commonly does not
involve substantial delay.'
Figure 7. Proposals for the Right to Call Special Meetings
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Bebchuk et al., supra note 4, at 795 (citation omitted).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015

37

Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 6 [2015], Art. 5
[Vol. 66

FLORIDA LAWREVIEW

2216

Figure 8. Proposals for the Right to Act by Written Consent
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Finally, over the last nine years, shareholders have proposed changes to
supermajority provisions in corporate charters that would either eliminate
such provisions or reduce the percentage needed to enact the subject of the
vote, shown in Figure 9. For example, a company's charter or bylaws may
state that the approval of the holders of two-thirds of the company's
outstanding shares is necessary to approve a merger or to amend the
bylaws of the corporation. As with many of the major types of proposals
promoted by shareholders, eliminating or reducing the percentage required
under a supermajority voting provision has the effect of reducing takeover
defenses.
Figure 9. Proposals to Eliminate or Reduce Supermajority Provisions
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IV. CATEGORIZING SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS: THEORY AND
RESULTS

As shareholder voting has become a more significant feature of
corporate governance in recent years, scholars have offered theories
explaining shareholder voting generally. 162 This Article expands on prior
work by drawing from recent shareholder voting results to show how
shareholder voting behavior
is largely driven by information costs and
63
1
costs.
agency
common
Most shareholders are information-constrained. 164 As with other
principals, they generally have less information than their agents-the firm
management-about firm objectives, opportunities, and performance, and
65
this informational asymmetry limits their effectiveness as monitors.'
Furthermore, even where shareholders have access to information so as to
reduce informational asymmetries-for example, shareholders may retain
proxy advisors to help provide this information and reduce some
66
information costs---evaluating the information remains a costly exercise. 1
Most shareholders will seek to rely on low-cost signals in making
decisions about firm governance. As noted by Professors Paul Edelman
and Robert Thompson, shareholder voting can be thought of as an error
correction mechanism; shareholders will support measures which allow
them to more easily correct (or, in some cases, prevent)
mismanagement,
167
relying on low-cost signals to spot and correct errors.
On the other hand, shareholders will resist expansions of shareholder
power for its own sake. As discussed below, the reason for this is also
explained at least partially by information costs. Some authors have
promoted shareholder empowerment as a means to reduce agency costs. As
shareholders become more powerful, they are better able to exercise
control over managers. 168 However, these arguments typically ignore the
costs created through shareholder empowerment; while costs of monitoring
managers may decrease, the cost of monitoring other shareholders-who
may seek private benefits or otherwise pursue initiatives not in line with at
least some other shareholders-increases. The Sections below describe
162. See, e.g., Robert B. Thompson & Paul H. Edelman, CorporateVoting, 62 VAND. L. REv.
129, 129-30 (2009) (explaining shareholder voting as an error correction mechanism).
163. For a brief summary of that prior work, see id. at 147-48.
164. Bebchuk, supra note 49, at 880-81.
165. See id. ("Unlike management, shareholders do not have access to inside, private
information.").
166. See Uri Geiger, The Casefor the Harmonization of Securities DisclosureRules in the
Global Market, 1997 CoLuM. Bus. L. REv. 241, 286-87.
167. See Thompson & Edelman, supra note 162, at 149-50.
168. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 17, at 660 (noting that proponents of shareholder
empowerment argue that shareholder interests are, in contrast to "conflicted managers," correctly
aligned and therefore, "shareholder authority would reduce agency costs and increase the value of
the corporation").
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these concerns in more detail, first discussing the effect of information
costs on shareholder voting, and then discussing the common agency costs
created by influential shareholders.
A. Information Costs
Choi, Fisch, and Kahan argue that shareholder voting entails high
information costs; the rise of proxy advisors may, then, be explained as the
result of federal requirements for many institutional investors to vote
proxies in the best interest of the investors on whose behalf the fund
invests, coupled with the high costs of acquiring information on individual
firms.'16 9 While proxy advisors play an important role in aggregating
information for the use of their clients, most proxy advisor clients do not
blindly follow the recommendations of proxy advisors.1 7 It seems
reasonable to assume that for most investors, stock prices are a more
important signal than proxy advisor recommendations, and that proxy
advisors reduce, but do not eliminate, information costs associated with
shareholder voting.17
It also seems reasonable to assume that shareholders will tend to display
a preference for low-cost signals when evaluating shareholder proposals.
All of the eight most important proposals described above require
shareholders to act on existing information. Thus, shareholders will prefer
proposals that permit the use of a simple signal such as a stock price over
proposals that require shareholders to gather more complex and costly
information, either in response to the proposal itself or in response to
future decision events.

169. See Choi et al., supra note 121 at 884-85; Stephen J. Choi et al., DirectorElections and
the Role ofProxy Advisors, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 649, 653-55 (2009).
170. Choi et al., supra note 121, at 881, 906.
171. See Thompson & Edelman, supra note 162, at 149-50. This is not to say that proxy
advisor recommendations are not an important factor in shareholder voting-indeed, they have been
shown to have a significant effect. However, research has also shown that proxy advisors are not the
most important factor driving voting decisions. As Jill Fisch noted in a comment letter to the SEC
regarding proxy advisors:
[A]n ISS recommendation shifts 6-10% of shareholder votes . . . a major

component of this influence may stem from its role as information agent aggregating information that investors consider important in making their voting
decisions.., federal regulation has fostered the growth of these firms by creating
a need for institutional investors to document the rationality of their voting
procedures. Although our study suggests that not all institutions blindly follow the
ISS recommendations, they nonetheless rely heavily on proxy advisors in making
their voting decisions.
Letter from Jill E. Fisch, Professor, Univ. of Pa. Law Sch., to the Honorable Mary Schapiro,
Chairman, U.S.
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Aug.
19,
2010),
available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-14-10/s71410-35.pdf.
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B. Common Agency Costs
Agency costs are another type of cost implicated by shareholder voting.
While shareholder proposals are often designed to reduce managerial
agency costs, shareholder empowerment can create what have been
described elsewhere as common agency costs. 172 In a common agency,
multiple principals with heterogeneous interests attempt to influence a set
of agents. 173 Assuming that shareholders will not always hold the same
interests with respect to various corporate governance structures, they may
seek to influence management to adopt conflicting governance structures.
That shareholders have varied governance preferences is evident by the
mere fact that shareholder support for various proposals varies widely from
issue to issue and from company to company. Because of these varied
interests, shareholders will tend to be hesitant to support changes that
empower other investors to influence corporate governance more directly
than a vote. This is due to the fact that shareholders will be required to
expend resources to monitor other shareholders and, potentially, risk a loss
of the value of their investment if more influential shareholders extract
private gains. 174
Common agency costs are most acute when the influential shareholders
hold small voting blocks.175 This is because, as with the reason for legal
prohibitions against the sale of corporate office, the risk increases that
shareholders with small shareholding blocks will have an increased
incentive to derive wealth from private benefits rather than merely from the
investment itself. As Judge Frank Easterbrook and Professor Daniel
Fischel put it, "the fiduciary principle bans the sale of office, while
allowing the sale of control, because control sales have built-in guarantees
of the buyer's good intentions but office sales do not. One who buys a
controlling bloc of shares cannot hurt the corporation without hurting
himself too.''176 Just as the common law disfavors arrangements whereby
shareholders receive the benefits of influence and control without having
fully paid for them, proposals that would decrease the cost of influence
should be disfavored by the majority of shareholders.
Furthermore, smaller but influential block holders pose problems for
other shareholders because those securities laws that can help reduce
common agency costs typically do not apply to smaller holdings; the
monitoring costs of other shareholders' activities thus increase. For
example, an investor that acquires over 5% of a company's stock and seeks
to influence the company is required to file a public 13D disclosure with
172. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 14, at 1380.

173. Id. at 1360.
174. See id.at 1385.

175. Id. at 1386.
176. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE EcoNoMIc STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE
LAW 133 (1996).
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the SEC detailing, among other things, the identity of the shareholder, its
funding sources for the purchase, and the purposes of the purchase which
triggered the filing.17 7 However, a shareholder who also seeks influence,
yet owns 4.99% or less of the company's outstanding stock need not make
such a filing. 178 Note, though, that the risks of private benefit extractioncommon agency risks-may actually be higher for smaller share block
holdings; as Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel have noted,
"[s]ubstantial investment acts as a bond for honest conduct."', 79 The
smaller the holding of an influential investor is, the smaller the bond and,
correspondingly, the greater the risk that the influential investor may seek
to maximize private benefits.
C. ShareholderMotivations: Disciplining Versus Empowerment
If shareholders tend to be concerned with information costs and
common agency costs, how will this play out in response to shareholder
proposals? Before this analysis can occur, some definitional groundwork is
necessary. As commentators have observed the evolving landscape of
shareholder activism, they have typically sought to categorize activist
investors or activism techniques in ways that help to explain the
motivations of various shareholders.' 80 Prominently, Professors Marcel
Kahan and Edward Rock describe "ex post" activism and "ex ante"
activism.1 81 They note that on one hand, mutual funds and pension funds
tend to use activism after a problem has arisen while on the other hand,
activist hedge funds tend to be strategic and ex ante by first determining
"whether a company would benefit from activism, then tak[ing] a position
1 82
and becom[ing] active."
Cheffins and Armour build on the distinction between ex ante and 1ex
83
post activism to describe "offensive" and "defensive" activism.
ex post" activism,
Defensive activism corresponds to the "incidental, ....
occasionally practiced by mutual funds and pension funds, that occurs
when an investor becomes dissatisfied with management and engages in
"behind the scenes" discussions or in a direct public challenge to

177. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (2012). Item 4 requires stockholders passing the 5%
threshold to "[s]tate the purpose or purposes of the acquisition of securities of the issuer. Describe
any plans or proposals," including plans to influence sales of assets, dividend distributions,
mergers, board changes, and other important corporate events. Id.
178. Id.
179. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 176, at 133.
180. See, e.g., K.A.D. Camara, ClassifyingInstitutionalInvestors, 30 J. CORP.L. 219, 252-53
(2005).
181. Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and
CorporateControl, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1069 (2007).
182. Id.
183. See Cheffins & Armour, supra note 1, at 56-57.
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management. 84 Typically, such defensive activists do not hold enough
shares to be able to obtain victory in a direct proxy contest but "potentially
can use their stake
as a departure point in garnering support for the changes
'85
they advocate."
On the other hand, Cheffins and Armour describe offensive activism as
the kind of "strategic," "ex ante" activism practiced by hedge funds. They
note that the term "offensive" should not necessarily suggest an adversarial
role with management because "[w]hile hedge fund activists have gained
notoriety for their confrontational approach, they often aim for a collegial,
if firm, 'hands on' approach with incumbent management .... Hedge
funds that engage in offensive shareholder '1activism
typically rely on the
'value approach' when identifying targets." 86
Just as shareholders and shareholder action can be helpfully
characterized as "ex post," "incidental," and "defensive," on the one hand,
and "ex ante," "strategic," and "offensive" on the other, this Article
proposes that one can differentiate between shareholder proposals that
stem from different motivations. Some corporate governance proposals are
designed to reduce agency costs by constraining management or providing
additional mechanisms to discipline management. This Article labels these
as "disciplining" proposals. Others are designed to empower shareholders
by giving them additional rights. This Article labels these as "empowering"
proposals. While there is some overlap between these categories, one
motivation or the other dominates most proposals.
Most shareholder proposals fall into the first category: they are
designed to discipline or to facilitate discipline. Proposals that are
primarily focused on disciplining management typically have lower
information costs to shareholders in the sense that shareholders need only
pay attention to simple, easily-obtained market signals-basic firm
performance measures such as stock price and earnings-per-share-when
deciding whether to make use of the mechanism provided by the proposal.
Examples of such proposals include:
" Anti-entrenchment provisions (poison pillsparticularly those that require shareholder approval for
implementation, or otherwise make it more difficult to
implement a pill-and classified boards);
* Proposals dealing with board election (but not
nomination), such as majority voting proposals; and

184. Id. at 56.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 57.
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* Board and chair independence (in the belief that
independent chairs and boards will do a better job
policing managerial agency costs).
These types of provisions are typically well-supported by most
shareholders because they enhance director and manager accountability and
reduce managerial insulation. 187 The appealing notion of such proposals is
not that they provide shareholders with additional managerialpower, but
that they provide them with additional discipliningpower.
This contrasts with empowering proposals that tend to expand
shareholders' ability not only to discipline but to intervene in management
affairs. These proposals are not focused simply on reducing agency costs
by constraining directors or aligning their interests with the shareholdersthe typical target of disciplining, "defensive" kinds of provisions-but with
empowering shareholders through an expansion of voting power or
enhanced use of existing voting rights. The most prominent examples of
this type of proposal are:
* Cumulative voting proposals, which have the effect of
giving expanded control power (through the ability to
appoint a director with fewer shares than would be
possible through straight voting) to minority
shareholders; and
" Shareholder rights to call special meetings or to act by
written consent, which allow minority shareholderspotentially even those with only a few shares-to
exercise voting rights more frequently than would
ordinarily be permitted
188 under a corporation's normal
voting procedures.
Overall, the voting trends seem to suggest that shareholders have a
slight preference for disciplining governance changes over empowering
governance changes. This suggests that shareholders may not value
shareholder empowerment for its own sake, but they do want the ability to
187. Another possible factor explaining support for proposals that erode managerial insulation
may lay in the investment patterns of institutional shareholders. Public pension funds, for example,
have increased their investment in "alternative" investments, including activist hedge funds, from
around 5% to 19% between 1995 and 2012. See Global Pension Assets Study 2013, TOWERS

WATSON 28 (Jan. 2013), http://www.towerswatson.com/en/Insights/IC-Types/Survey-ResearchResults/2013/01 /Global-Pensions-Asset-Study-2013 (click on "Download PDF"). Arguably, then,

pension funds and other institutional investors in hedge funds will support governance changes that
facilitate hedge fund activism in order to increase returns.
188. As Bebchuk et al. suggest, the rights of shareholders to call a special meeting and to act
by written consent are not best categorized as disciplining mechanisms because the structures they
are designed to combat are not particularly effective as entrenchment devices. See Bebchuk et al.,
supra note 4, at 795; see also supra note 147 and accompanying text.
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punish directors and officers when things are going wrong. One of the
primary mechanisms they have used to do this is the new market for
corporate influence, reinvigorated by the reduction of some of the
"insulations" that previously protected boards.
Figure 10 shows proposals that tend to support ex post, incidental, or
defensive discipline of managers. As discussed earlier,1 89 proposals to
repeal classified boards of directors have received strong support for years,
and in the past few years the support from the total outstanding shares has
been greater than 50%. Similarly, support for proposals to eliminate or
reduce supermajority provisions has been near or greater than 50% over the
past eleven years. Support for majority voting structures increased
dramatically. The only proposals of this type that have not received
significant support are those that seek to separate the chair and CEO roles
or otherwise call for an independent chair. The lack of support here is
perhaps best explained by the fact that separating the roles is a dramatic
form of discipline; unlike the other kinds of disciplining proposals,
separating the chair and CEO does not simply facilitate discipline-it is
itself a strong form of discipline.1 90
Figure 10. Disciplining Proposals
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Proposals that tend to empower shareholders in excess of their
economic rights-in other terms, proposals that tend to give shareholders
power that is not fully paid for-receive lower levels of support, even
189. See supra Section III.B.
190. For example, even the $6.2 billion "London Whale" scandal did not convince
shareholders to support a proposal seeking to oust Jamie Dimon, JP Morgan's CEO and board

chair, from the chair role. Indeed, the proposal received only 32% of the outstanding shares in
support, less than the 40% received for a similar proposal in 2012. Dawn Kopecki & Hugh Son,
Victoryfor Dimon as JPMorganShareholdersReject CEO-ChairmanSplit, BLOOMBERG (May 22,
2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-2 l/victory-for-dimon-as-jpmorganshareholders-reject-ceo-chairman-split.html.
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where they may be presented as reducing managerial agency costs. As
shown in Figure 11, all of the empowering proposals that expanded
shareholder rights in this way received weaker support than proposals that
sought to discipline without increasing shareholder influence or granting
additional rights.
Figure 11. Empowering Proposals
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While the effect is not extreme-significant numbers of shareholders
support empowerment proposals-the data show recognition of the danger
of shareholder influence when it is not fully paid for. In the last five years,
shareholders have supported disciplining proposals at an average rate of
44%. If we exclude proposals to appoint an independent chairman or
separate the board chairman and CEO positions, which as noted earlier are
draconian measures that shareholders are reluctant to support, the level of
support rises to 50%, a crucial threshold that, as Ertimur, Ferri, and
Stubben identified, is associated with increased likelihood of
implementation.191 Part of the explanation of the importance of the 50%
threshold is likely found in the fact that ISS evaluates decisions to vote on
individual directors, committee members, and entire boards by how they
respond to shareholder proposals, particularly when, as stated in ISS' 2014
U.S. Proxy Voting Summary Guidelines, the board "failed to act on a
the support of a majority of the shares
shareholder proposal that received
192
cast in the previous year.'
In contrast to the higher levels of support for disciplining proposals,
support for empowering proposals averages about 31%. This suggests that
shareholders are more than one-and-a-half times more likely to support
disciplining proposals than shareholder empowering proposals. Voting
191. Ertimur et al., supra note 69, at 69.
192. 2014 U.S. Proxy Voting Summary Guidelines, INSTITUTIONAL S'HOLDER SERVS. INC.
(2014) at 12, available at http://www.issgovemance.com/file/files/ISS2014USSummary
Guidelines.pdf.
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patterns generally reflect the wisdom of the same public policy that
prohibits the sale of corporate office: Shareholder power must be fairly
purchased. Additionally, the last few years have also seen decreases in
support for shareholder empowering proposals, suggesting that
shareholders may be satisfied with existing-and predominantly
disciplining-governance mechanisms.
Additional support for the theory set out in this Article is seen in recent
proxy access proposal votes. If shareholders are concerned about common
agency costs, they should be less likely to support proxy access proposals
where shareholders with relatively smaller percentages of shares are
empowered to place nominees on the corporation's proxy. That is precisely
what occurred in 2013. According to Georgeson Shareholder, there were
three main versions of proxy-access proposals in terms of share ownership
requirements, and they each had markedly different levels of support: 193
Version of Proxy Access Proposal
Any shareholder owning 0.5% of

Average Support
8.8%
~..

Lvotable shares

Investors who own 1% of total
outstanding shares consecutively for
aperiod of one year or more
-1
Hiolders who collectively own 3%/ of
a compnpy's shares consecutively for
three years or more

33.7%

An essential question for future research is how shareholders are using
the disciplining power that they have gained over this remarkable period of
proposal activism. As noted earlier, most large companies have removed
much of the structural insulation that limits shareholder influence, such as
classified boards and plurality director elections. If shareholders are quick
to discipline managers based on stock price, common agency problems
also arise as influential shareholders pressure management to make
business policy changes. Furthermore, Professors William Bratton and
Michael Wachter point out, "[t]he market price sends reliable governance
signals only in a subset of cases characterized by clear-cut issues and
minimal information asymmetries. As governance issues become more
complex and information asymmetries more pervasive, market signals
become difficult to read."' 94 Shareholder power creates risks, and more
research is necessary to determine if the benefits of the agency-costreducing effects of shareholder empowerment outweigh these risks and the
193.

GEORGESON SHAREHOLDER, ANNUAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW: SHAREHOLDER

PROPOSALS AND

PROXY CONTESTS

10 (2013), available at http://www.computershare-

na.com/sharedweb/georgeson/acgr/acgr2O13.pdf.
194. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 17, at 689.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015

47

Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 6 [2015], Art. 5
2226

FLORIDA LAW RE VIEW

[Vol. 66

additional burdens of common agency that shareholder empowerment
creates.
CONCLUSION

The period from 2003 to 2013 signaled a remarkable shift in the use
and effectiveness of shareholder proposals, which in turn continues to
strengthen a more shareholder-centric/agency model of corporate
governance. Shareholders pursued many different types of proposals over
the last eleven years, but eight stand out as most important to corporate
governance. This Article provides important evidence on how these
proposals were received by shareholders generally, and provides clarity on
the role of shareholders in corporate governance.
The evidence presented here affirms that shareholders are increasingly
willing to pursue proposals that enhance the accountability of managers.
The scandals of the early 2000s catalyzed a movement in shareholdercentric corporate governance that has not abated. Consistent with
legitimate concerns about shareholder empowerment, the evidence
presented in this Article indicates that shareholders are cautious in how
they allocate power. While most shareholders support measures that
facilitate managerial discipline, they are more cautious in their support of
proposals that empower other investors and add to their influence over
managers.
This Article has argued that this behavior reflects shareholder concern
over two types of costs. First, as diversified investors, the majority of
shareholders seek low information-cost signals of firm performance. This
would predict support for disciplining proposals that allow shareholders to
key off basic financial performance measures; as other scholars have
discussed, most shareholders are more interested in defensive, ex post
activism, to the extent they engage in activism at all. Supporting the
different types of disciplining proposals identified above assists
shareholders in defensively protecting their investment by reducing
managerial entrenchment and exposing managers to the market for
corporate influence and corporate control.
On the other hand, this Article has identified significantly lower levels
of support for even the most successful empowering proposals. This
Article explains this difference through reference to common agency costs
realized when numerous shareholder/principals seek to influence a single
set of manager/agents. These empowering proposals have a common
feature: they all promote shareholder influence in excess of a
commensurate economic interest held by the activist shareholder. This
raises concerns that activist shareholders will attempt to use their influence
to extract private benefits at the expense of the other
shareholder/principals. Most shareholders appear to recognize the threat
presented by a common agency in which small block holders are
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss6/5
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empowered to influence management and these shareholders vote in
disapproval accordingly.
Although not a primary focus of this Article, executive compensation
votes provide another example of a preference for disciplining mechanisms
over empowerment mechanisms. Under the information and common
agency costs theory outlined in the Article, shareholders should be
rationally skeptical of proposals that give shareholders additional rights to
review or limit executive compensation; the board will be best placed to
evaluate the various inputs that go into determining appropriate
compensation levels. Shareholders will still want the ability to use readily
attainable signals-the performance of the company relative to its peers,
for example-in determining whether to vote for an incumbent slate of
directors or on an executive compensation plan. Likewise, they may be
willing to limit certain pay practices that pose the risk of high agency
costs-golden parachute plans, for example. However, they should be less
willing to support executive-compensation-related proposals with high
information costs, especially as shareholders' ability to discipline
management increases generally. Consistent with this intuition, executive
compensation proposals-particularly after Dodd-Frank-have not been
submitted in great numbers and have not received significant shareholder
support in general (with the exception of golden parachute proposals). In
2013, only two types of executive compensation proposals appeared in
significant numbers: proposals requiring equity to be retained and
proposals eliminating accelerated vesting in termination/change-of-control
situations.
Proxy access proposals will likely become more important in coming
years. Although only six nonbinding proposals were submitted in 2012,
four binding proxy access bylaw proposals were submitted, all of which
were from Norwegian sovereign, wealth fund manager Norges Bank
Investment Management (NBIM).195 Support averaged about 34% of votes
cast. 196 In 2013, eleven proxy access proposals were submitted. 197 Unlike
in 2012, NBIM decided not to submit binding bylaw proposals in 2013, but
had similar support of approximately 34%.19" If the theory outlined in this
Article is correct, we will likely see more of these proposals in the future,
but they are unlikely to be successful unless the bylaw
199 restricts proxy
game."'
the
in
"skin
significant
with
access to investors
195. See

GEORGESON

SHAREHOLDER,

ANNUAL

CORPORATE

GOVERNANCE

REVIEW:

SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS AND PROXY CONTESTS 10 (2013), availableat http://www.computersharena.com/sharedweb/georgeson/acgr/acgr2Ol3.pdf.
196. Id. at 11.

197. Id. at 10.
198. Id. at 11.
199. As a patient, long-term investor that typically holds significant positions in its many
portfolio companies, NBIM would likely meet such criteria. However, NBIM has submitted
proposals seeking proxy access for holders of as little as 1% of the total outstanding shares. Id.
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Finally, shareholder voting patterns also have general implications for
shareholder engagement. The popularity of proposals that serve to facilitate
managerial discipline has increased pressure on boards and managers to
more directly engage with shareholders. 200 Companies are spending more
time, money, and effort in shareholder engagement programs. However,
engagement programs may also be counterproductive, and directors and
officers should exercise care when engaging with shareholders.2 °2
Shareholders who are part of the market for corporate influence due to
their large block holdings-hedge funds or other large institutional
investors, for example-are likely to engage management in an effort to
enhance firm value. On the other hand, shareholders who are using the
engagement process as a megaphone should not receive the same deference
from management; indeed, voting patterns suggest that other shareholders
seem to support the idea that management should not engage with these
shareholders.

200. See Fairfax, supra 116, at 831 (noting that increased shareholder activism has led
shareholders to demand greater engagement).
201. See generallyAnastasia O'Rourke, A New PoliticsofEngagement: ShareholderActivism
for CorporateSocialResponsibility, 12 Bus. STRATEGY & ENV'T 227 (2003).
202. This is true not only for the reasons stated above, but also because of the looming risk of
violations under Regulation FD under the Exchange Act of 1934, which places restrictions on the
transmission of material, nonpublic information to certain shareholders. 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100243.103 (2012).
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